Title

On Frege’s Alleged Indispensability Argument

Authors

Pieranna Garavaso, University of Minnesota, MorrisFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

6-1-2005

Embargo Period

12-4-2017

Publication Title

Philosophia Mathematica

Abstract

The expression ‘indispensability argument’ denotes a family of arguments for mathematical realism supported among others by Quine and Putnam. More and more often, Gottlob Frege is credited with being the first to state this argument in section 91 of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Frege's alleged indispensability argument is the subject of this essay. On the basis of three significant differences between Mark Colyvan's indispensability arguments and Frege's applicability argument, I deny that Frege presents an indispensability argument in that very often quoted section of the Grundegesetze.

Volume

13

Issue

2

First Page

160

Last Page

173

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nki018

ISSN

0031-8019

Comments

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Philosophia Mathematica following peer review. The version of record:

Garavaso, ”On Frege’s Alleged Indispensability Argument,” Philosophia Mathematica 13(II) (2005), pp. 160-173.

is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nki018

Rights

© Oxford University Press, 2005, all rights reserved

Recommended Citation

Garavaso, ”On Frege’s Alleged Indispensability Argument,” Philosophia Mathematica 13(II) (2005), pp. 160-173.

Primo Type

Article