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# One Minute to Midnight: The Problems of Order in Latin America<sup>1</sup>

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An attempt to describe in broad strokes some of the many problems facing Latin America.

While many of these problems are not new, attitudes toward them have changed; the revolution of rising expectations" is very much in evidence. Perhaps the most important complicating factor is the unprecedented rate of population growth, highest in the world, which aggravates the already acute problems of housing, education and urbanization. Economic development is handicapped by inflation, dependence upon single exports, lack of capital, and resistance to basic changes in the social and economic structure. The United States should encourage necessary change and support the development of democratic institutions but without equating the latter with the particular economic and political arrangements peculiar to us.

## Some Definitions and Assumptions

Problems of stability and order have plagued much of Latin America for generations. They have also taxed the ingenuity of the makers of American foreign policy, especially in more recent times. This paper will attempt to describe some of the many aspects of the problems that complicate any projected solutions. Some suggestions will also be made for types of action that might be taken by the United States to enhance the prospects for order in Latin America. The function of this paper is more to be provocative than exhaustive.

The terms "American" and "Latin American" will be used, as they commonly are in this country, to refer respectively to the United States and its residents and to the 20 republics south of our borders and their residents. The word "order" presents some difficulties, however. If we are satisfied with dictionary definitions of "a state of peace and serenity, freedom from disturbance, general tranquillity, public quiet, or rule of law", then order is hardly a laudable objective. Such order can obtain under a Hitler, Stalin or Trujillo.

It is not order, then, but a certain kind of order that is worthy of the search. Peace, yes, but peace coupled with freedom in a context of progress. Perhaps the preamble to the Charter of Punta del Este, which established the Alliance for Progress on August 17, 1961, gives appropriate expression to this aim.

We, the American Republics, hereby proclaim our decision to unite in a common effort to bring our people accelerated economic progress and broader social jus-

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tice within the framework of personal dignity and political liberty . . . The men and women of our Hemisphere . . . are determined for themselves and their children to have decent and ever more abundant lives, to gain access to knowledge and equal opportunity for all, to end those conditions which benefit the few at the expense of the needs and dignity of the many.

If this is the kind of order we seek, it should be obvious that it cannot be accomplished overnight. Indeed, it has not yet been fully achieved in the United States. The challenges are great and all kinds of fascinating questions arise: must order come from disorder? can authoritarianism lead to democracy? will the United States resist social change even as it urges social change in Latin America? While answers are not so easily forthcoming, these questions must be grappled with in one form or another.

Before the Latin American problem areas are sketched, it may be well to state a number of elemental propositions or assumptions about order and development which may be taken for granted but often go unrecognized. They are applicable to other developing nations, not just those in Latin America.

1. In almost all cases, the power of the United States to control or influence is limited. Even where the United States is able to do little, it should do what it can.

2. Any policy involves much risk and uncertainty, even a policy of doing nothing and sitting tight.

3. Although money is essential, order cannot be purchased with money alone.

4. Development will not take place in countries unwilling to work and sacrifice for it.

5. Even in countries willing to work and sacrifice, development may be slow.

6. Basic changes in many countries must take place for development.

7. There is doubt that some of these changes can occur without revolution or violence.

8. The development of economic and political forms

for the achievement of order is likely to be different from that in the United States.

9. The free play of private enterprise will not suffice.

10. There is no guarantee of success.

### Latin American Problems

Whenever Americans think of Latin America—which is seldom—they tend to think of it as a unit. Certainly common elements are to be found among the Latin American nations and peoples but the diversity is all the more striking because of these. Indeed, in a number of areas many people are not even “Latin” Americans. The contrasts are often sharp, the range is often wide. One can go from an almost feudal, absolute dictatorship to an advanced democratic welfare state, from over 90 per cent illiteracy to less than 15 per cent, from a life expectancy below 35 to one above 60, etc.

On the other hand, even in the presence of common cultural elements, many Latin Americans find it difficult to think in terms of Latin American unity. Argentines and Chileans have no great love for each other, and both view Brazil with suspicion. Peru and Ecuador still have their problems, while the Colombians look down upon Panamanians. Yet the Iberian heritage has been a great force for unity, although seldom expressed in political or economic terms.

Many of the problems facing Latin American nations have confronted them for years. What has changed greatly is the attitude toward these problems. There is a sense of urgency in the demands for solutions, an awareness that progress is possible, a belief that improvement can take place here and now. The “revolution of rising expectations” is making its mark. Nevertheless, the road ahead is very rough, indeed.

While most of Latin America may be referred to as “under-developed”, differences with the emerging nations of Asia and Africa should be recognized. Most of the latter are newly independent, while most Latin American nations have been self-governing for a century and a half. In addition, the political, social and economic institutions of most of Latin America tend to be in the Western tradition. Furthermore, while illiteracy rates are high in many areas, the proportion of educated persons, including college graduates, is much higher than in many other developing regions, especially those in Africa.

One can hardly minimize the difficulties involved in the attempts of Latin Americans to take their places on the world scene as developed nations. Mention will be made of some of the many problems and factors that must be considered.

*Population growth.* The population of Latin America is growing at an unprecedented rate, faster than in any other major region in the world. At its present rate of growth—at least three per cent per year—its population will double in 23 years. Thus the 230 million Latin Americans of today will increase to over 600 million by the turn of the century.

Some individual figures are even more startling. Costa Rica’s annual growth rate is 4.4 per cent, possibly the

highest in the world, a rate at which her population will double in 16 years. Even today almost half her people are under 15 years old. But Costa Rica is a tiny nation. Brazil, already the eighth most populous nation in the world, has a 3.6 per cent annual growth rate that will double her population in 19 years. (In contrast, the present growth rate of the United States is 1.6 per cent annually.)

Furthermore, it should be noted that, in almost every Latin American country, the growth of population in the last decade was more rapid than in the previous decade. Thus, the annual growth rates, already the highest in the world, have increased sharply. There are no indications that this trend will be reversed in the near future.

(Figures for countries and continents tend to obscure the human aspects of the problem. One official told me of a Nicaraguan whom he had employed for seven years. The employee was brooding about his situation and when the official asked why he was so disconsolate, he replied, “Well, I’ve been thinking. When I first came to work for you, I had just been married. Each year since then I have had a wage increase, and each year I have had a child. Today I am worse off than when I started.”)

*Health.* Progress in the area of health has been the major factor in the population rise. Measures to wipe out malaria and other infectious diseases, reduce infant and maternal mortality, establish sanitary water and sewage systems, etc. have had a spectacular impact on the death rate. In little more than a generation the death rate has been cut in half in almost every Latin American nation. At the same time, the birth rates have changed only slightly. The results of this combination are obvious.

It should not be assumed, however, that nothing remains to be done in the area of health. The infant mortality rate is still four times that of the United States while the proportion of physicians and hospital beds is much less than half. Even so, the pressure of population upon existing resources is very great; further accomplishments in the field of health will not reduce this pressure. One official of the Agency for International Development told me that the AID had “quietly” decided to avoid projects that held great prospect for increasing the population. This is difficult to do because it seems almost as if “every time we spray a field with DDT, the population nearby goes up.” No one really suggested that health measures be curtailed but everyone seemed concerned that progress in other areas would founder in the quicksand of population growth.

*Housing.* One problem obviously aggravated by rapid population growth is that of housing. It is frequently estimated that 80 per cent of the Latin American people live in dwellings that are below minimum standards of habitability. The average number of persons per dwelling unit in Latin America is between five and six; in the United States it is between three and four. Perhaps these figures do not seem startling until it is recognized that over three-fourths of Latin American dwelling units

have two rooms or less; the comparable figure for the United States is less than one-twelfth (*Study of International Housing* 1963:3, 10).

In terms of meeting the housing needs, the most successful Latin American nations have been running hard to stay in the same place; i.e., they manage to keep housing needs from increasing in the face of a burgeoning population, but they have been unable to make substantial cuts in the deficit. In most nations, however, the situation has become even worse.

*Urbanization.* The housing problem is intensified by the trend toward urbanization found throughout the hemisphere. In most of Latin America, this trend was given its impetus in the 1920's but has been accelerated in the postwar years. Furthermore, while many cities have experienced growth, the largest (usually the capital) cities have grown fantastically. Buenos Aires is over six million, Mexico City over five million, while Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo are about four million each. Caracas has gone from under half a million to almost two million and Bogota from 250,000 to 1,500,000 in a very short time. Other cities display similar patterns.

Even more striking is the fact that in many countries such a high percentage of the total population lives in the largest city. In at least seven of the 20 countries, one-sixth or more of the population lives in the capital city. If this were true of the United States, the population of Washington, D.C. would be over 32 million!

While immigration and natural increase have played a part in the rapid growth of some metropolitan areas, there seems little doubt that internal migration has had a major impact. Rural people come to the cities in ever increasing numbers hoping to find a better life. They rarely have adequate resources so they become urban squatters. Even though conditions are poor they seldom return to their rural homes. In Rio alone, the number of people living in the shantytown "favelas" covering the hillsides is greater than the number of inhabitants of Minneapolis.

Paradoxically, even a partial success in providing adequate housing may tend to heighten the problems. Those who manage to secure a place in a low cost housing project are likely to write home of their good fortune and the news tends to stimulate further exodus, since the pull to the city is already great. One of my Guatemalan informants was in a small town when a report of a new government project came in. In less than 24 hours, more than 100 people asked his advice on how to sell their property and go to the city where "the government was giving free houses."

Rapid urbanization brings with it many problems other than housing, of course. Public health, employment, transportation, crime and delinquency, family and social organization—all these and more confront the observer. Elaboration of these matters will not be undertaken here however.

*Education.* Latin American needs in the realm of education are critical. About 43 per cent of the peo-

ple are illiterate with a range from under 15 per cent in Argentina and Uruguay to about 90 per cent in Haiti. Actually, these figures probably underestimate the proportion of illiterates. I was told in Colombia that literacy was frequently determined simply by asking people whether they could read and write.

The effects of illiteracy are widespread. Illiterates are easier victims of those wishing to exploit them. They are more often ignorant of their rights as citizens and of the importance of national issues. They are less easily trained for the job opportunities of a developing economy (Porter and Alexander 1961: 55). And while the number of literates is increasing, so is the number of illiterates in many areas.

The problems of primary education are enormous, and they are compounded by the growing population. In the rural zones of Columbia, for every 100 pupils who enter the first grade, 47 enter the second grade, 6 enter the third, and one enters the fourth. Many never even get to the first grade, of course. Only about 8 per cent in Colombia get a complete primary education.

In Mexico, despite exceptional efforts and expenditures, of every 1,000 children who begin school more than half drop out before the end of the first year and 866 drop out before completion of the primary grades. Only 59 enter secondary school and less than half complete it. Six of the 1,000 enter a university but only one in that thousand eventually receives a university degree.

In 1930 there were 1,800,000 students in Brazil's elementary schools; in 1960 there were 5,800,000. And another 1,700,000 in that age group were still not in school. Most of the elementary schools have no books. More than half of the students have teachers who have never attended secondary school. The great expansion of students has resulted in deteriorated standards for teachers (Benton 1961: 107-114).

*Land reform.* Another burning issue in Latin America is that of land and agrarian reform. The concentration of ownership is striking: About 90 per cent of the land belongs to 10 per cent of the owners. "In Guatemala 516 farms (0.15 per cent of all farms) represents 41 per cent of the agricultural land. In Ecuador 705 units (0.17 per cent) include 37 per cent of the farm land . . . Half the farm land in Brazil is in the hands of 1.6 per cent of the owners. In Nicaragua 362 owners have control over fully one third of the agricultural acreage." At the other end of the scale, the picture is equally impressive. "In Guatemala 97 per cent of all farms are in units of less than 20 hectares. [A hectare is 2.471 acres.] The corresponding figure for both Peru and Ecuador is 90 per cent, for the Dominican Republic it is 95 per cent, for Venezuela 88 per cent and for the private sector of the Mexican farm economy 88 per cent. In Colombia some 325,000 farms average 0.5 hectare, and a further half a million farms average 2.5 hectares" (McClellan 1963: 51-53).

But while the cry for "land reform" is widespread and the political case for it seems clear, the economic case is by no means simple. Most of the small farmers repre-

sent a hand-to-mouth type of farming and are outside the market economy. Under the large landowner, production per man and per acre is much higher. Hence, one of the first effects of land redistribution is frequently a sharp drop in productivity. More is needed than merely breaking up the large estates.

New relations have had to be set up between the farmer and his market, his technical capacity to get good use out of his land and the credit resources which permit him to use the new techniques. Emphasis has been placed by many agencies on the building of local organizations, development of credit institutions, and provision of technical assistance (seed, machinery, fertilizer, water, etc.) Since conditions and habits differ from area to area, agrarian programs take many forms.

The difficulties involved are many. Berle (1962:51-57) reviews them succinctly:

Peasants want land. Division of land does not produce food. To the contrary, the breakup of the cultivated large estates means, initially at least, a drop in productivity . . . Settlement of peasants on unused land means little unless the new settlers are equipped with a grubstake to enable them to survive the first year of clearing and reducing the land to tillable form, and also a kit of tools or credit by which these can be bought. If the new settlements are to be more than bare and miserable subsistence communities, there must be road connection to cities and markets, schools, water, and a modicum of public utilities. Filling these needs places a financial burden on the state in any case heavy, though it varies depending on conditions. . . .

Most difficult of all is the problem propounded if and when "agrarian reform" really becomes successful. As noted, 70 per cent of the two hundred million of Latin America's population are employed in agriculture. Compare this with the United States, where 10 per cent of the population produces a greater agricultural product than the country can use. If even fractionally successful, sound agrarian reform means that continually fewer farms and farmers will increasingly and continually produce more and more agricultural products. Over a long pull, this simply means that less and less agricultural labor, employed or self-employed, will be needed. Increasingly there will excess population in the rural regions. This population will float toward the great city centers—as indeed it is doing now.

*Industrialization.* One possible answer lies in growing industrialization. From 1950 to 1957, industrial production in Latin America increased 37 per cent. This was an improvement but far below the area's potential. The range of development is very wide. Countries like Haiti and Paraguay have hardly begun. On the other hand, according to Rostow (1961:127), the take-off stage has been completed in Mexico and Argentina, and it is under way in Brazil and Venezuela.

The requirements for capital in Latin America are immense, indeed. Expenditures for industrial plants will need to be extensive (not to mention expenditures for public works—housing, roads, transportation, schools, electricity, water supply, sanitation, etc.). While a great deal of Latin American capital exists, it has not suffi-

ciently carried the burden of industrial development in these countries. Latin Americans do not normally think of wealth as liquid; they display a kind of "tangible materialism." Land, cattle, urban real estate, etc., are customary, but securities of industrial enterprise are less acceptable (Council on Foreign Relations 1960:38-39). Furthermore, whenever capital for industry has been forthcoming from Latin American investors, an extremely high rate of return is anticipated; an expectation of 40 or 50 per cent return is not unusual.

Expenditures in the public arena are almost exclusively made by governments who may raise the money by borrowing, taxing or inflating the currency. The Latin American capitalist shows little interest in buying fixed low interest government bonds. Income taxes are bitterly denounced, fought and evaded. And inflation can be escaped by deposits of money abroad, while the value of property investments tends to rise.

*Inflation.* The economic headache of inflation has been particularly severe in several Latin American countries. Between 1953 and 1960, the cost-of-living-index for Uruguay rose 244 per cent, for Argentina 464 per cent, for Brazil 326 per cent, for Paraguay 240 per cent, for Chile 1,043 per cent, and for Bolivia 3,005 per cent. Although some nations have managed to stem the tide somewhat since then, others have not; Brazil's cost-of-living is still shooting up. While the United States worries about a monthly increase of two tenths of one per cent, Brazil may experience a monthly rise of 10 or 15 per cent. In most cases the middle income groups have managed to hold their own but the lower income groups have frequently lost ground (Benton 1961:57).

*One export economies.* Still another problem is the fact that the economies of so many Latin American countries depend on a single export, with the result that fluctuations in the prices of these commodities have a resounding impact. Since world price fluctuations may be 25 or 50 per cent in a year, this is obviously a matter of great concern. Fourteen of the 20 republics depend on a single product for over half their export earnings; in fact, seven countries depend on a single product for two-thirds or more of these earnings.

The clearest case is that of coffee. Exports of coffee run from 51 to 77 per cent of the total exports of six Latin American countries and from 15 to 30 per cent of the exports of four more. It has been estimated that a change of one cent in the world coffee price means \$50,000,000 to Latin America. Thus the problem is not to be taken lightly in those nations (Benton 1961:34-35, 61-62; Committee for Economic Development, 1961:-26-28).

*The middle class.* Another feature of the Latin American scene is the rising middle class, despite the frequent claim that it is absent. Members of the middle groups differ widely in their economic standing and seem to lack class consciousness, but there are some common characteristics. In most cases, they may be distinguished from the lower classes by their literacy and disdain for manual labor, while the absence of claims to power

based on ancestry or great wealth sets them off from the upper classes. Estimates are that almost 20 per cent of the population belong to the middle groups, with great variations from country to country. Their role in the future may well be crucial (Council on Foreign Relations, 1960:24-28; The Annals, March 1961: 21-22).

But increasing industrialization and the rise of the middle class pose a threat to those who hold power in a number of Latin American countries. Silvert (1963:30) makes clear the dilemma of

. . . elite groups faced with the problem of sharing their power if eventually they are to lead true nations, and the possibility of losing their near-monopoly of power should they decide to share it. How to maintain a sufficient velocity of national development to satisfy the requirements of social and economic development and still not fall into suicidal demagoguery and insupportable anticipatory "populism" is a major problem in some countries. In others, the question is how to prevent industrialization from increasing the power of certain groups to such an extent that they may be emboldened to strive with all their might and main to prevent continued economic development from leading to more popular social and political participation in the fruits of the new world.

The question is whether those in power in most of Latin America will continue to resist basic and inevitable changes in the social and economic structures of their nations. While exceptional instances occur, there is little evidence to indicate any great change. Indeed, one of the chief criticisms in Latin America of the Alliance for Progress is that it expects to achieve objectives like land reform by placing the responsibility for such programs in the hands of those who stand to lose the most from their success. This reluctance to destroy the bases of one's power is reminiscent of Winston Churchill's well known refusal to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire.

Other factors confronting Latin America could be discussed: the problem of *governmental authority*, the role of the *military*, the role of the *church*, the *political parties* and their problems, the *trade unions*, the *value systems*, etc. Enough has been said, however, to make crystal clear the complexities of the Latin American scene. Unqualified generalizations and easy solutions do not apply; simple cause and effect relations are not readily apparent. Progress, even with an alliance, is much more difficult than we had imagined. In the face of all this, what should our policies be?

#### **American Policy Toward Latin America**

To some extent, the very use of the term "underdeveloped nations" implies an obligation for us to contribute to the development of the countries so designated. Myrdal (1957:7-8) has pointed out that the phrase acknowledges "that those countries are right in demanding higher standards of income, a bigger share in the good things of life, and greater equality of opportunity." The implication is that "it is an accepted goal of public policy that the countries so designated should experience economic development." The old static term, "the back-

ward nations", never carried the dynamic overtones of the new one.

By and large, the United States has accepted much of the burden necessarily devolving upon the developed nations of the world. Only recently, however, have the Latin American countries begun to get the attention they deserve. The Alliance for Progress is the latest and most ambitious project entered into by the United States and 19 of the 20 Latin American republics. It calls for massive social and economic change; to expect its accomplishment in ten short years is to underestimate seriously the many existing and forthcoming obstacles. Yet a beginning can be made.

In the economic sphere, the United States should continue to give direct economic aid, as well as encourage other nations to do the same. While economic development must await the establishment of great social changes, as Heilbroner (1963:54) points out, this does not mean that economic aid cannot help bring about those changes. Thus, aid should not be given in indiscriminate fashion, but to accomplish specific objectives. There is no reason to grant millions of dollars in aid without setting conditions under which such aid is to be spent.

Latin Americans generally do not object to our giving aid with strings attached; indeed, they would consider us foolish not to do so. The objection is rather to arbitrary or unreasonable conditions, or to those that seem designed more to benefit the United States than the nations to the south. For example, a requirement that the receiving governments match the amount of aid for a given project may be reasonable; a condition that American products or ships be used when cheaper ones are available would not be reasonable.

Even more important, our assistance must not be conditioned on the extent to which development is carried out within the so-called "free enterprise" framework. The circumstances in which most Latin American countries find themselves today are vastly different from those that led to the economic patterns found in the United States. In most cases, the public sector will have to play a greater role than we are used to. Nothing good can result from labeling as "socialistic" or "communistic" anything that we would not like in the United States. Indeed, this merely alienates many Latin Americans and makes them wonder if we really are committed to the values of the free world. Our goals should include the development of democratic institutions, but we would be wise to refrain from equating the latter with the particular economic arrangements peculiar to us.

Much of the necessary investment capital must come from abroad, and the United States should encourage this. At the same time, it should be made clear to Latin American nations that those who accept our aid and investments must do what they can to limit the flight of local capital from their countries. If Latin Americans fail to invest in their own country's future, they can hardly expect foreigners to do so.

The United States should encourage savings and capital formation in these nations. This may be an almost

impossible task, particularly in the extremely underdeveloped areas. It may require the postponement of rises of living standards (which may not be politically feasible). Forced saving is neither popular nor pleasant but, then, it never was. Aneurin Bevan may have been right when he said, "It is highly doubtful that the achievements of the Industrial Revolution would have been permitted if the franchise had been universal. It is very doubtful because a great deal of the capital aggregations that we are at present enjoying are the results of the wages that our fathers went without . . ." (Scott 1960: 117).

It may be advisable to work toward the stabilization of export prices of those commodities that largely dominate an economy. This should be accompanied by adequate limitation of production, by efforts at diversification, and by attempts to insure that the benefits accrue to the whole population, not just the local producer. The movement toward a common market should be encouraged and applauded. The Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association are hopeful signs but they have yet to be tested. Reduction or removal of restrictions on Latin American goods could be undertaken, even if it hurts.

It is not enough that the people of Latin America begin to share in the increase in the wealth of their developing countries; they must actually believe that they are getting their share. Steel mills and port facilities are not alone convincing but measures in the realm of housing, health and education may be more effective. In the long run, this last item may be the crucial one.

The importance of educational development at all levels cannot be overemphasized. Education should have a top priority in any program of American aid. Not only does an educated citizenry provide support for economic development but it also establishes a base for the development of democratic institutions. Of course, there is no guarantee that an educated people will choose democracy but that is a risk worth taking.

In the more political arena, we must make it clear that we are not opposed to change. Change is certain, one way or another, sooner or later, with or without our support. As Berle (1962:30) puts it, "The policy of the United States should not — indeed cannot — be directed toward preventing revolution. Its real task is to promote social change, if possible without violence, and to prevent revolution from being betrayed into the prehensile grip of the overseas imperialist Communist powers. Far from opposing social change, American policy can and must aim toward defending and protecting it."

In this respect, the record of the United States is not a shining one. Our history displays frequent instances of support for dictators in this hemisphere. Sometimes the pressure comes from the military, sometimes it comes from business groups, but the results are the same. Dictators have been wined and dined, granted loans, praised publicly, and even awarded medals. The story is too long to tell here (Porter and Alexander 1961: 189-196; Madariaga 1962:98-121). Latin Americans can hardly be blamed for viewing us with suspicion; why have we been

so slow to move against the many black dictators but so swift in our actions against the red dictators?

One way to reduce the suspicion that we are a counterrevolutionary power is by giving strong support to the Organization of American States, the World Bank and other international institutions. Some of our aid could be channeled through these organizations. A strong OAS could be a potent force in hemispheric affairs. Two specific actions that the United States could take might go far toward raising our prestige in Latin America. The Panama Canal could be turned over to Panama or the OAS and the "blockade" of Cuba could be called off.

Every effort should be made to insure that the Alliance for Progress is really a cooperative enterprise and not a one way street. Latin American nations should not only help themselves, they should help each other and help the United States in ways open to them. There is much to be learned from Latin America, but it is not as easily exportable or transferable as money or credits.

Above all, it is imperative that the United States make clear its position in a rapidly changing world. It must set its standards in advance of events and must then adhere to them as consistently as possible. The United States must pursue policies that are admirable in their internal as well as external relations. It must be the example, not in precise forms but in adherence to principle and concern for the freedom and welfare of mankind.

There is considerable doubt that the United States will be able to set the example. Domestic political considerations and the pressure of special interests are not to be dismissed lightly. The concern for private comfort and private consumption remains unabated. There are hopeful signs, to be sure — the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps, the drive for civil rights — but the American scene has not changed markedly since the London *Times* editorialized, "Nevertheless, the impression reflected by the last session of Congress is of a country willing to defend itself with commendable vigor but unwilling to change in any significant way. The open question is whether in the long run it can defend itself without changing" (*Minneapolis Tribune*, Nov. 29, 1961:4).

If the United States hopes for good neighbors to the south, it must first of all be a good neighbor itself. Perhaps Barbara Ward (1962:150) is right when she says that "generosity is the best policy and that expansion of opportunity sought for the sake of others ends by bringing well-being and expansion to oneself." But even if these do not result, one should be a good neighbor. If all efforts fail, we need never echo the words of Marshall Petain on the fall of France, "Our spirit of enjoyment was greater than our spirit of sacrifice. We wanted to have more than we wanted to give. We spared effort, and we met disaster."

Justice Douglas (1960:40) has noted that the Chinese word for "crisis" is made out of two characters; one is "danger", the other, "opportunity." Certainly, in the coming years, the United States will confront one crisis after another in Latin America as well as in the rest of the world. The risks will be great, our power limited. We must not succumb to the urge to interpret everything in the light

of the Communist threat, real though that may be. The future may be uncertain but it is not necessarily dark. And, as J. Robert Oppenheimer once said, "If we are wholly guided by fear, we shall fail in this time of crisis. The answer to fear cannot always lie in the dissipation of the causes of fear; sometimes it lies in courage."

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