

1959

The Politics of Galbraith's Affluent Society

James R. Klonoski
St. Olaf College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/jmas>



Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Klonoski, J. R. (1959). The Politics of Galbraith's Affluent Society. *Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science*, Vol. 27 No. 1, 43-53.

Retrieved from <https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/jmas/vol27/iss1/8>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science by an authorized editor of University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well. For more information, please contact skulann@morris.umn.edu.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE POLITICS OF GALBRAITH'S AFFLUENT
SOCIETY

JAMES R. KLONOSKI
St. Olaf College, Northfield

The title of this article might well be rephrased to read, "A Political Scientist Looks at The Affluent Society" (Galbraith, 1958). It is probably presumptuous for a political scientist to attempt to examine Galbraith's work, *The Affluent Society*. As the book jacket notes, "In this important book a literate and versatile economist scrutinizes current ideas and attitudes in economics." The fact is that political scientists are supposed to know little economics. At the same time, however, my own political science training and my bias tell me that economics and politics are interwoven parts of the fabric called society. Further, Aristotle concluded that political science is the master science. He noted all human endeavor, including the economic, as ultimately controlled or conditioned by politics and government. A primary reason prompting this article is John Galbraith's political orientation. Galbraith is a Democrat in the party sense; as such he has a message for Democrats which goes far beyond the narrow loyalties of party affiliation. Galbraith indicts liberals, i.e., Democrats, as well as Republicans, i.e., conservatives, for the obeisance they give to the conventional wisdom of economics. By conventional wisdom Galbraith means such things as a belief in production for private consumption as the measuring stick of economic, indeed, national health; the need for economic incentive to insure progress; doubt about the ability of governmental goods and services to make a positive contribution to our way of life; and in general all those values that the American business community and consequently so many of us Americans prize so highly. There is no more meaningful experience for a political partisan than to be told by a fellow party partisan that the dogma upon which the party builds its platform every four years has a rotten substructure. While Galbraith made no such direct statement in *The Affluent Society*, in this scholarly, non-partisan work he, the objective economics professor, (sometimes Democrat) wisely tells us all (Democrats, Republicans, independents) that we would do well to reexamine the economic platitudes by which we live if we are to engineer an escape from those forces which hold us captive (Galbraith, 1958:4).

THE MINNESOTA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE

I propose to look at *The Affluent Society* in two ways: from the practical political point of view and from a more intensive theoretical political science point of view. For whatever ideas Galbraith sets forth and proposes will—with an Aristotelian inevitability—be conditioned by politics, government and the theoretical underpinnings—in a political sense—of our society. Economists propose—politics and governments dispose.

I. A PRACTICAL POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW OF *The Affluent Society*

What, then, does Professor Galbraith propose? What are the implications and possible ramifications of such proposals where politics and government are concerned? In the broadest view, Galbraith proposes a redefinition or modification of the meaning of “freedom,” though no such proposal is anywhere made explicit. Although Galbraith speaks of freedom always in the context of economics, economics is only one part of the life of the state. Freedom in economics or any area of the life of the state inevitably must be referred to or defined in terms of governmental policy. Such would be the case with freedom as now defined in the conventional wisdom if Galbraith’s suggestions for changed economic policy were to be implemented. The economic principles by which men live are part of the total pattern of principles by which they may be judged more or less free. At the moment Galbraith says that we consider a man free if he is “left with his income to decide between a better car or television set” (Galbraith 1958:267). On the other hand, he asserts, “A community decision to have a new school means the individual *surrenders* the necessary amount in his taxes” (i.e., loses “freedom” to do with his property what he will). (267). Freedom in the conventional wisdom of economics can thus be thought of as the ability to opt for personal wants and desires over against the needs or demands of the community of which the individual is a member. In the example given immediately above, the ability to choose for self or for community is immediately economic. In the broader perspective of the conventional wisdom, however, such freedom to choose is symptomatic of—or better, *is*—the liberty possessed by the individual. Freedom in the conventional wisdom of economics is defined in terms of the individual’s ability to resolve the individual-community tension in favor of the individual through what amounts to an absolute claim to the right of property possession and disposition. Freedom tends to resolve itself into an immediate satisfaction of self through the acquisition and use of goods. It is *not* the long range satisfaction and development of self through contributions to the improvement of the community generally—such contributions ultimately redounding to the benefit of all the individuals making up the community through the community’s heightened ability to provide a fuller and richer environment for individual development.

Galbraith believes that the conventional wisdom with its emphasis on the satisfaction of immediate human wants by means of production and consumption develops—or *frees*—only one part of man’s being. The apologist for the conventional wisdom argues that this free-

dom makes possible, indeed underlies, whatever other freedom man enjoys. Galbraith addresses himself to this claim where he remarks:

“The Benthamite test of public policy was ‘what serves the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ and happiness was more or less implicitly identified with productivity. This is still the official test. In modern times . . . we have sensed, though we have not recognized, the declining importance of goods. It is so much simpler than to substitute the other tests: compassion, individual happiness and well being (as related to all aspects of existence), the minimization of community or other social tensions—which now become relevant” (Galbraith 1958:288-9).

Galbraith really wants to redefine societal goals. Such goals we attempt to reach through politics and government. His central proposal in *The Affluent Society* is that we must begin to place more stress on building up the community by increasing the supply of governmental goods and services while decreasing the emphasis we place on production for the satisfaction of immediate, material private wants.

Translated into political terms, Galbraith’s suggestions would require that politicians and those in government sight as their goal and the goal of the electorate more and improved public services rather than the goal of lower taxes—even though lower taxes in the conventional wisdom supposedly guarantee increased production and consumption of private goods (the free, consequently the good life). Political parties and politicians—if I read the politics of *The Affluent Society* correctly—would campaign realistically on platforms stressing the need to expand greatly our educational plant, our “program” of government scholarships, our highways, our recreation areas, our public health facilities, our foreign aid program, our law and order establishments and the like. Through the subsequent passage of legislation at all levels of American government the social imbalance existing between private goods and public goods and services would be redressed.

How would increased public goods and services be paid for? Higher income taxes? No. Sales taxes? Yes. Sales taxes would pay for public goods and services, especially on the state and local levels where social imbalance is so obvious and compelling. Galbraith, a liberal, confounds all liberals with such a choice. Traditionally, as Galbraith indicates, “The test of the good liberal is that he is never fooled and that he never yields on issues favoring the wealthy. Behind him, always challenging him, is the cynical Marxian whisper hinting that whatever he does may not be enough” (82). Here, what liberal Galbraith would propose to do is considered by most liberals not only not enough but almost an act of treason. Abandoning the progressive sales tax device based on the ability to pay for the regressive sales tax hardly seems on Galbraith’s part to be an act of liberalism, most liberals argue. Galbraith’s answer is that attempts to do anything with the progressive income tax on the level of state or national politics is to invite impasse, because 1. we have mined the income tax field for about as much as we can get in light of political reality (83-4), and 2. feeling

THE MINNESOTA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE

is so latently intense in this area of economic debate that the present truce over the existing rates should be respected (313). On the national level, Galbraith suggests that we should attempt the politically possible as concerns our tax program. The politically possible includes filling in current tax loopholes, modifying drastically downward the depletion allowance tax in such industries as gas, and modifying or abolishing the capital gains provisions of our present income tax laws which permit individuals to immunize income from the higher rates of the income tax code (314).

What are the practical political possibilities of realizing such a program? How about the American people? How about the political parties? How about our political leaders? How about the federal system? How about the separation of powers? How do all of these political parts fit into the Galbraithian redefinition of freedom in terms of emphasizing community needs rather than the more personal, property wants of the individual?

Let us first examine the American people. Are they ready to abandon the conventional wisdom for Galbraithian wisdom? The findings of a Gallup Poll recently published in a Minneapolis newspaper show that "Americans are complaining less about the amount of their income taxes this year than at any time in the last ten years."¹¹ As compared with a 1952 high of 71%, a 1957 figure of 61%, only 51% of Americans now feel that their federal income tax is too high. Approximately 40% of the people feel that it is "about right". Use of these findings as a benchmark upon which to measure Americans' disposition to pay taxes of all kinds at all levels of government would probably yield inconclusive results. Apparently there is a tendency on the part of a great many Americans at the moment to feel more kindly about taxes in spite of the propaganda barrage which equates lower taxes with true freedom.

A sales tax, to be sure, is a relatively hidden way of transferring money from the private sector to the public sector of society. In light of this fact and in light of an uneasiness in parts of the electorate about the condition of our schools, highways and public health facilities, it may well be that a sales tax earmarked for such goods and services would not be vehemently objected to despite the gloomy forebodings of the conventional wisdom over the danger of increasing the supply of governmental goods and services. Writing in the *New York Times* recently, James Reston insisted that Americans are waiting to hear and act upon noble ideas. (N.Y. Times, 1959: 4:8c). Whereas a sales tax as such may not be a particularly noble idea, a sales tax tied to the public needs of the community may very well approach nobility despite the grumblings of some traditional liberals.

Yet there always continues the conventional wisdom's insistent plea to the people that an increase in government goods and services—however financed—represents a step towards socialism and a consequent loss of freedom. The conventional wisdom has convinced too many Americans that private well being gauged in terms of property accumulation is synonymous with the general well being of society.

The patent short-sightedness of such an outlook in this day when

production for profit, that is, production for consumer goods, does not fulfill the expanding public needs of an integrated, interdependent society is—sadly enough—too often considered to be abstractly correct by most Americans while concretely they continue to add to their pile of consumer goods. Such an observation moves off into the realm of theory however, while here we are more concerned with the practical possibilities of making operational the wisdom found in *The Affluent Society*.

How about our political parties? Can they catch the vision of the noble idea and carry it into government where it will be transformed into public policy? Are our political parties adequate conduits whereby *ideas* from the academic world and society generally are carried out into the public forum? Will our parties, in line with their classical educative function, bring to public attention and debate the challenge laid down in *The Affluent Society*? Will we have the opportunity to compare the economic wisdom of Galbraith with the conventional wisdom of economics?

Our parties and their leaders, with some exceptions, reflect rather completely the values and outlook of the vast mass of American citizens. This in a practical sense is as it should be, for political parties are instruments of the people's will. In the conventional wisdom of political science, however, political parties are also thought of as possessing a leadership role. The problem is to develop leadership qualities in the parties and the party leaders—leadership qualities based on the certain knowledge that without leaders—political style—the people perish. But parties in this country are traditionally the agents of compromise. (Ranney, 1958:53). Their basic mission has been less to lead than to reflect, pull together, and unite the diversities of what Ernest Griffith calls the "dispersive state". (1956:121). How we make our political parties (or one of the parties) agents of Galbraithian wisdom in a multi-interest group society where there is no commonly-consented-to or community definition of the public good in public, non-privatistic terms is the crucial problem.

There does exist some cause for hope, nevertheless. Our parties are not ideological or programmatic except perhaps when the challenge becomes as real and vivid as did the challenge to action in the 1930's. The parties' mission of the moment, if they are so minded, is to convince the people that the starved nature of the public sector of American society is as immediately and menacing a problem as was the soup line of yesteryear.

I am convinced that a few individuals at the top levels of the parties who sense the problem and the need, who have read *The Affluent Society*, who know that history demands that we act, will take the lead if action is to be forthcoming. Here, party leaders with vision like Hubert Humphrey and Nelson Rockefeller come into focus. The Humphreys and Rockefellers through the spark of their leadership must kindle within their parties a flame which will sweep before it much of the old flimsy intellectual and organizational structure of the parties as they are presently constituted. Neither a Humphrey nor Rockefeller can accomplish such a result without an awareness

THE MINNESOTA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE.

within the parties that there exists a public mood demanding such action. Such a mood has not been overwhelmingly in evidence the past few months.

The federal system—that ingenious American device whereby we settle power on two levels of government—must be considered in a practical sense if any attempt is to be made to put into practice the wisdom of *The Affluent Society*. In cutting up governmental power into two parts, we make it well-nigh impossible for either level of government to deal effectively with the public problems of our time. The states are to a great extent living anachronisms—in spite of Galbraith's emphasis on the need for state sales taxes—because so many problems have moved beyond the geographical limits of the states. We have recognized this fact somewhat in our old age pension program, wages and hours legislation and to a lesser extent in our unemployment insurance program. Some states, even with a sales tax, would be unable to provide the kind of public services their citizens need.

At places in *The Affluent Society* Galbraith does directly acknowledge the need for more complete and direct national governmental activity and leadership in the federal system. An example is his suggestion that the Cyclically Graduated Compensation program “should be a purely federal enterprise. . . .” He continues, “. . . . economic policy relating to the level of economic output is now recognized federal responsibility. The federal government is accountable.” (299) Galbraith thus seems to recognize the inevitability of national government leadership in redressing the balance now existing between the private and public sectors of American life. I suspect that what Galbraith really would like is a national sales tax so that we could truly accomplish in an even-handed sort of way the fully rounded development of the public sector—conceived of in national terms. He apparently is willing to settle for something less.

All these implicit or explicit proposals are in defiance of the conventional wisdom—political as well as economic style. Like the conventional wisdom of economics, the conventional wisdom of politics holds that an increase in the powers and activities of the national government is a threat to individual liberty. Again, here is a problem for our political parties, our political leaders and the American people generally. In terms of our institutions and our outlook, we must somehow make our peace with the nationalizing nature of the 20th century which seems to demand broadly-scoped governmental activity rather than narrowly limited governmental activity. We will have to come to think more in terms of the tyranny of the rigidity of the conventional wisdom—political style than in terms of the threat—we are told—that government poses to our free way of life. Doubtlessly, government planning will have to be fitted more centrally into our conduct of affairs. The expansion of public goods and services must be done rationally and with a sense of direction as to where we want to go. The people, speaking through their elected representatives, will have to possess the decisive voice, though there is room for imaginative and positive political leadership.

PROCEEDINGS, VOLUME TWENTY-SEVEN, 1959

And as for the separation of powers, that other very practical political device whereby the guardians guard one another, both the Congress and the President must reach the conclusion that the Galbraithian analysis of the existing social imbalance is a valid one. The separation of powers as such is not the greatest problem to the realization and expansion of the public sector of American life. Still, the presidency, as the truly *national* office, is better situated to sense the national public need than the Congress, a more parochial body less aware and less able to visualize the overriding nature of our national, public need. (Emphasis on parochialism is not to ignore Galbraith's conviction that the states can act progressively and in the broad interests of the nation by building up their public sector through measures such as the sales tax). The intent here is to stress the strategic character of the presidency. By exploitation of the resources of the office, the occupant of the presidential office can educate the country and Congress to national need, even when that need is cut up into 50 pieces by the existence of the states. Through contact with the nationalizing influence and outlook of the presidency, members of Congress alerted to the need to redress the existing social imbalance should be able to act as intelligent agents of the Galbraithian wisdom back in the states and districts from whence they come. In this way corrective action by a more educated state electorate, state political parties and state government could be induced. Such a prognosis is perhaps rather far fetched and visionary. It assumes that congressmen and senators exert an effect on state politics and government—something they traditionally have not done. (Schattschneider 1942:ch. 7). But awareness must come to the states. A realization of need will have to be stressed, and reliance cannot be placed exclusively on the shoulders of state officials. Senators and representatives returning from Washington will have to make a contribution. Not all of them will do so, but some of them, having caught the vision of the balanced society from their education in national office, will inevitably return to the states as missionaries.

At the same time one must be fully cognizant of the fact that on page 309 of *The Affluent Society* Galbraith says:

"The problem will not be settled by resolving to spend more for schools and streets and other services, and to tax accordingly. Such decisions are made every day and they do not come to grips with the causes of the imbalance."

Galbraith then goes on to explain that the deeper cause is simply that societal goods and services do not lend themselves to being sold to individuals as do private goods and services. Thus, no profit can be made in an immediate material sense, no capital plant can be replenished or expanded—hence, there is no immediate driving force for the creation of public goods and services. That is why Galbraith wants to institutionalize a fiscal technique like the sales tax to insure that the public sector and community needs will always be fed by a source of wealth.¹

¹ Galbraith, p. 312. The greatest insurance guaranteeing the public sector against starvation would be the lessening of the pressures of the arms race. Money would then be freed for investment in public goods and services. Galbraith takes note of the fact where

THE MINNESOTA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE

II. THE THEORETICAL POLITICAL SCIENCE POINT OF VIEW

I should like to use Galbraith's acknowledgment that the causes "lie much deeper" to move into an area of ideas that have already been called the conventional wisdom—political style. An understanding of the theoretical underpinning of the conventional wisdom—political style sheds great light on the problems pointed up by Galbraith in *The Affluent Society*. The conventional wisdom—political style is a body of dogma rooted in the 17th century preachments of John Locke. Locke analyzed the state in instrumentalist terms. He viewed the state and society as products of man's will. (1924:158 seq.). The instrumentalist sees the state as "unnatural". Man from this point of view is not made for society, but society is made for man. Locke explained that individuals found it convenient (i.e., in their self-interest) to create the state to protect their property—an otherwise unsure possession in the state of nature where man had his origin. Locke did not claim that individuals were anti-social in the state of nature preceding the establishment of the organized state as did Hobbes; rather, men were more unsocial or asocial. Men occasionally stepped on one another's toes in this state of nature. In the absence of a higher authority than themselves, as asocial individuals they had no way to redress the grievance of bruised toes short of physical retaliation. Bruised toes in Locke's thinking meant loss or threatened loss of property. Man, possessing reason, eventually willed himself out of the state of nature into the organized state to gain protection for his property, Locke explained.² Property in Locke's analytical model was the absolute. The state guaranteed the security of property.³ The state not only guaranteed the security of property but its existence also provided security and a resultant incentive to individuals to secure more property.

Implicit in Locke is the assumption that private well being is the equivalent of the public interest.⁴ For years, such was actually the case in the United States. Property in land meant security, property meant

he says, "In the mid-fifties defense expenditures were rather more than half of all the expenditures of the federal government . . . Were this sum to become available in any considerable part for the civilian services of government in the years ahead, social balance could be quickly restored . . . Perhaps the time will come when federal revenues and normal increases will not be pre-empted so extensively for military purposes. Conventional attitudes hold otherwise; on all prospects of mankind there is hope for betterment save those having to do with an eventual end, without war, to the arms race." (312)

²"The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting." (Locke: 180)

³Locke did not overlook the community's interest in property once private property was brought within the confines of society:

"For it would be a direct contradiction for anyone to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of properly, and yet to suppose his land, whose property is to be regulated by the laws of society, should be exempted from the jurisdiction of the government to which he, himself . . . is a subject. By the same act, therefore, whereby anyone united his person which was before free, to any commonwealth, by the same he unites his possessions, which were before free, to it also, and they become, both of the person and possession, subject to the government and dominion of the commonwealth as long as it hath being." (178)

For a discussion of Locke's sense of community derived from the medieval tradition, see George Sabine, 1950:524-26.

Unfortunately, the American environment with the abundance of free land and the lack of need for positive government produced a concept of property which emphasized its private rather than communal nature. See Louis Hartz, 1955:60-62.

⁴Sabine: (1950:529) "Locke fastened on social theory the presumption that individual self-interest is clear and compelling, while a public or social interest is thin and unsubstantial.

freedom—and security and freedom created an atmosphere and community in which men liked to live. Inevitably, with industrialization, the growth of population and the disappearance of the frontier, men came to live closer together. Life took on greater complexity. Serving of individual self-interest did not necessarily serve the needs of society. In other words, the imbalance noted by Galbraith came into being because the simplistic Lockean analysis could not provide—and justify the need—for public goods and services. The fact is that we are now at a period in history where private well being measured in terms of accumulation of goods can furnish neither the motive power nor the gauge of the good life. Societal (community and public) needs in the form of schools, recreation areas, public health facilities, and roads and highways are imperatives which private property accumulation as such cannot provide for. We are now being called upon to view society as natural rather than “fictitious.” We are being called upon to acknowledge that society, of and by its very nature, has a need for public goods and services as such that are immediately unrelated to private profit seeking by means of production of consumer goods. The latter process does not naturally produce public goods and services. Thus we reach the Galbraithian position, starting from the conventional wisdom—political style.

We are called upon to develop what the theologians and philosophers call a social ethic, what political scientists call a sense of community. We must learn to think of the state in Aristotelian terms as well as in Lockean terms.⁵ We must view the state more in an organic sense than has been our wont. (Ebenstein 1956:66). Society in this organic sense is natural and men are social creatures who only develop themselves fully in interaction with their fellows in the context of a well-ordered, well-looked-after society.⁶ History is asking us to “shift the gears of our value system.” Americans must learn to look beyond private property to the needs of society as a whole if we would further our well being and opportunity to develop ourselves fully.⁷

⁵ I avoid the use of “Platonic-Aristotelian” on the basis of Aristotle’s own objection to the Platonic organic state model: “Now I also am willing to agree with Socrates (Plato) in the principle which he proceeds upon and admit that the city ought to be one as much as possible: and yet it is evident that if it is contracted too much, it will be no longer a city . . . for a city does not consist of a large number of inhabitants, but there must also be different sorts . . . indeed Plato supposes that a city owes its existence to that sufficiency in themselves which the members of it enjoy. If then this sufficiency is so desirable, the less the city is one the better.” (Rhys, ed., 1912:27–28.)

See also William Ebenstein, *Great Political Thinkers* (2d ed., New York: Rinehart and Company, 1956), at p. 67: “The danger of all organic theories of the state is that they tend to stress communal unity over individual differences and to subordinate the individual to the state. Plato’s conception of the state carried the idea of unity, implicit in all organic theories, to the excess of self-destruction; Aristotle found the counterweight to such an extreme and perfectionist view in the elements of his thinking that pointed toward relativism and pluralism.”

⁶ Though I advocate that we capture the community spirit and consciousness of the Aristotelian state, I do not hold that we should view the state as an end in itself in the manner of the Greeks. See Sabine, (96-97) where he says, “Aristotle’s ultimate effort at a definition turns upon his conviction that the state alone is self-sufficing, in the sense that it alone provides all the conditions within which the highest type of moral development can take place.”

For a point of view which holds that we are now, in our peculiar way, an integrated community, cf. Hartz (1955:55–56).

⁷ “Yet as time goes on, the awareness is growing . . . that the state is more than an instrument or piece of machinery, that the democratic state in particular must aim at becoming a community, not only of law, but of fellowship. Underlying the modern development of the welfare state is the notion that society must have no outcasts, that its inequalities must be reduced, and that the basic amenities of civilized life must be accessible to all.” (Ebenstein, 1956:67)

THE MINNESOTA ACADEMY OF SCIENCE

The whole life is a product of the whole society—a society where the public sector is looked after and balanced against the private sector. Otherwise, as Galbraith insists, we are only half a community. Moreover, Khrushchev, forcibly pushing along an organically organized state, stands a good chance to “bury us” unless we contemplate more fully the unconventional wisdom of *The Affluent Society*.

Recently, Professor Andrew Hacker wrote that, “national citizenship remains an unworkable concept because the individual requires a smaller group setting if he is to achieve a sense of community.”⁸ Hacker presented no empirical evidence to substantiate this contention.⁹ A voluntarily arrived at sense of national community may be beyond the psychical powers of the average man. If so, let us hope that the states, following the advice of Galbraith, decide to raise the public standard within the confines of their more limited geographical setting. Let us hope that somehow national well-being will emerge from such a fifty-fold effort to build the good society within political entities which, from the viewpoint of many, have little in common with the urgencies of the time. Free man may be able to unite voluntarily with a sense of true community consciousness only in limited areas such as the states.¹⁰ If such be the case, our dilemma is even more cruel than I imagined.

In offering my own summary, I could go on to say that the reason we must “come around” is because of the seriousness of the Soviet threat. However, I prefer to argue within a national rather than an international frame of reference. I recognize, too, that the well balanced society thought of in national terms is perhaps an anachronism. As long as need exists anywhere in the world, particularly private need, we have no right to think narrowly of achieving a social balance within the confines of the United States. That is a problem much bigger and admittedly more meaningful than John Galbraith addressed himself to in *The Affluent Society*. The object of the article, however, was to make politics out of the economics of John Galbraith, and those politics of necessity have been as narrowly circumscribed as the economics of *The Affluent Society*.

My own conviction, nevertheless, is that *The Affluent Society* should be a campaign document in the 1960 election. It is a platform on which, if we are to survive as the good society, one or both of the parties must run. Anything less will make political mockery out of what may be our last great chance to shape the world in the democratic image. Freedom in the fullest sense of the word—in a sense that will have appeal particularly in those areas where the “revolu-

⁸ Andrew Hacker, (1958:13). He adds, “The national government—as socialists thought the world have discovered, is too large and unwieldy to provide satisfaction.” p. 9.

⁹ The evidence he introduces is the conclusions of those modern day authorities who have speculated on the individual-community relationship: “The local community continues to be stressed by modern thinkers of all ideological persuasions. Writers who are otherwise in complete disagreement—such as Erich Fromm, R. A. Nisbet and B. F. Skinner all emphasize that citizenship lacks vitality outside the context of a small and coherent community.” (1958:6)

¹⁰ Hacker is equally pessimistic about this possibility: (1958:9) “. . . local governments are too weak and ineffectual to cater to such deep-seated (community) needs.” Hacker offers no real alternatives or solution to the problem except in a negative sense where he says, “Indeed, it is doubtful if the government of a free society should undertake responsibility for ensuring, say the mental health and social adjustment of its citizens. Such programs are perhaps possible only in totalitarian society.”

tion of rising expectations" is at work—must be reworked by us so that freedom will connote the idea of community well being as well as individual well being. Anything less from us will be the sheerest kind of political irresponsibility.

LITERATURE CITED

- EBENSTEIN, WILLIAM 1956. *Great Political Thinkers*. (2nd ed.) New York, E. P. Dutton & Co.
- GALBRAITH, JOHN K. 1958. *The Affluent Society*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co.
- GRIFFITH, ERNEST S. 1956. *Congress: Its Contemporary Role*. (2nd ed.) New York, New York University Press.
- HACKER, ANDREW 1958. "Politics and the Corporation", *Occasional Paper, Fund for the Republic*.
- HARTZ, LOUIS 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America*. New York, Harcourt Brace & Co.
- LOCKE, JOHN 1924. *Of Civil Government*. New York, E. P. Dutton, (Everyman's Library.)
- New York Times* 1959. February 8, 1959, Section 4, p. 8e.
- RANNEY, AUSTIN 1958. "Politics, Parties, and Civil War", *American Government Annual* (I. Hinderaker, ed.). New York, H. Holt.
- RHYS, ERNEST, ed. 1912. *The Politics of Aristotle*. New York, E. P. Dutton, (Everyman's Library).
- SABINE, GEORGE 1950. *A History of Political Theory*. (rev. ed.) New York, H. Holt.
- SCHATTSCHNEIDER, E. E., 1942. *Party Government*. New York, Rinehart & Co.