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onetime enemies. Paraphrasing the remark of a famous Englishman, —having met disaster like men, may we meet success like gentlemen.

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FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

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In an address before the American Historical Association in 1940, Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, advanced the hypothesis that Japan had adopted the externals of western material civilization, while maintaining unchanged the essential core of her ancient culture. Japanese thought and behavior patterns still follow the established traditions, and the Japanese in the privacy of his home is a totally different person from the Japanese business man in his office or shop, for example. Westernization, then, has penetrated to no real depth the life of the Japanese nation.

Dr. Hu's observation suggests an interesting approach to the problem of the basic conflict between Japan and the United Nations which burst into open warfare with the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941. The question which it raises is whether Japan on the one hand and the United Nations on the other had yet reached the point where they sufficiently understood the psychological functionings, the thought processes, and the motivating ideas of each other. It will be the thesis of this brief paper that the present conflict is a result, in part at least, of this divergence in cultures; and also of two other basic issues—the matter of race superiority and inferiority, and the clash of vital national policies.

The intangible divergence in mental processes is well illustrated by the following quotation from the *Japan times weekly* for October 12, 1939:

At the outbreak of the China affair, Japan tried to present her case before the world in a simple and straight-forward manner. Yet, some of the Powers not only refused to listen, denouncing whatever Japan stated as "propaganda" in its sinister aspects and shoving it aside, but obligingly went to the extent of hurling slanderous remarks and insulting comments. Japan remained stoically silent in the face of this calumny, certain in belief that those Powers would realize their own folly sooner or later.

Such protestations of injured self-righteousness are utterly incomprehensible to the western mind. This and other Japanese statements seem so completely at variance with the logic of the facts that the western reader is amused at Japanese duplicity and naivete. One writer, however, answers that to the Japanese this is not pre-

tense. Miss Barbara Wertheim, writing in *Foreign affairs* for April, 1936, declares that "appearances mean more than reality to the Japanese mind" and that the Japanese can make statements "knowing they present a false picture, yet sincerely believing them."¹

This same imponderable quality is hinted at by Tatsuji Takeuchi, eminent professor of international relations at Kwansai Gakuin in Kobe and author of *War and diplomacy in the Japanese Empire*. In an article in *Amerasia* for June, 1938, Takeuchi alludes to a certain "dualism of Japanese mentality," which he alleges to be largely responsible for Japan's failure to obtain a more friendly hearing abroad. He says that such terms and ideologies as "we are fighting in China because we love the Chinese" or "we want to establish permanent peace in the Orient" convey "a definite meaning when addressed to the Japanese but may evoke totally different responses to those hoped for from Americans."² Such thought processes are quite foreign and incomprehensible to the western mind and serve but to create suspicion and mistrust.

Other elements too raise doubts among the peoples of the west as to whether Japan should be received wholeheartedly into the society of western nations. The Japanese claim to direct descent from the sun goddess and their worship of the emperor strike the western mind as somewhat queer. When this same worship produces such fanaticism that fighting men become human bombs with total disregard for human life, the effect is rather sobering. Moreover, the treatment of prisoners in the China war, and the sack and rape of Nanking created doubts as to the humanity and degree of real civilization among the Japanese. Even the assiduous courtesy in Japan, with all its elaborate forms, frequently strikes the visitor from the Occident as strained and unnatural.

But the difficulty of understanding is not all on one side. Many of the usages of modern diplomatic intercourse and many of the rules of western warfare seem strange and unnecessary when judged by traditional Japanese standards. The concept of compromise in negotiation, for example, is foreign to the Japanese. To him negotiation means the attempt of each party to secure the complete acceptance of his desiderata by the other. The Japanese hears much of the so-called "Christian" nations and wonders as to their sincerity when practice seems such a far cry from theory. He sees no logic in the contemporary opposition of western nations to imperialism when Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands have all acquired stakes of the world's riches in the recent past. He asks why the rules of the game should be changed just because Japan was a late-comer on the imperial scene. The west seems most inconsistent. The evidence, then seems to indicate a mutual failure to understand

¹ Wertheim, Barbara, "Japan: a clinical note," *Foreign affairs*, XIV (April, 1936), 520-522.

² Takeuchi, Tatsuji, "The background of the Sino-Japanese crisis," *Amerasia*, II (June, 1938), 183.

and appreciate each other's point of view, psychology, and traditions. Such understanding must be the foundation of any whole-hearted cooperation and lasting peace.

Another potent factor underlying the clash between Japan and the United Nations is the western attitude of superiority in dealing with nations of the Orient. It stems in part from the superior material civilization of the newly industrialized west when the first modern contacts were made with the isolated Japanese island kingdom. It stems too from the eager adoption by the Japanese of things western and from the western failure to appreciate the finer things in Japanese culture. It was this superiority complex which contributed to the flamboyant western imperialism of the late nineteenth century, the arrogance and self-assurance which could make a Chamberlain say, "I believe that the British race is the greatest of governing races that the world has even seen;" or a Curzon announce that "the British Empire is under Providence the greatest instrument for good that the world has seen. . ."³

Japan bowed to this superior force in the bombardment of Shimonoseki, in the imposition by the west of extraterritoriality and tariff control, and in the action of the Far Eastern Triplice at the close of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. She felt most keenly the discriminatory treatment of her nationals by immigration and land laws in Australia, Canada, and the United States. As Ambassador Hanihara pointed out to Secretary of State Hughes in the memorable note of April 10, 1924:

The important question is whether Japan as a nation is or is not entitled to the proper respect and consideration of other nations. In other words the Japanese Government ask of the United States Government simply that proper consideration ordinarily given by one nation to the self-respect of another, which after all forms the basis of amicable international intercourse throughout the civilized world.⁴

The affront of exclusion aroused bitter feelings in a sensitive nation and remained a barrier to better understanding.

Japan developed an inferiority complex in the face of this western assumption of superiority. Perhaps Japan was aware that much of her new civilization was but imitation of the west, just as much of her older civilization had been an acquisition from China. Perhaps to compensate Japan proclaimed her skill at eclecticism and at improvement of innovations from overseas. She sought the approbation of the western powers and their acceptance of her as an equal. In 1935 I remember the eagerness with which one of the most prominent citizens of Osaka sought my verdict on the relative

³ Quoted in William L. Langer, *Diplomacy of imperialism* (2 vols., New York, 1935), pp. 92, 93.

⁴ Quoted in A. Whitney Griswold, *The far eastern policy of the United States*, (New York, 1938), p. 373.

merits of the Hotel New Osaka and the best hostelrys in the United States. True recognition of equality Japan has never gained. Her most ambitious attempt failed at the Paris Peace Conference where the racial equality amendment fell a victim to the obstructionist tactics of Minister Hughes of Australia and to the fears of President Wilson as to California's susceptibilities.

The complex has led Japan to self-assertion. In this connection one might recall the chauvinistic national monuments at Port Arthur site, as the inscriptions loudly proclaim, of the first great victory of the yellow race over the white in the Far East. The newspapers report that similar national monuments and museums are now to be constructed at Singapore. Japan has imitated the imperialistic west. As victor in the Sino-Japanese War she burdened China with extraterritoriality in 1896. Later in 1915 she tried to impose the Twenty-One Demands upon the young Chinese Republic. Or, to cite a more recent instance, her insistence upon naval parity with Britain and the United States in 1930 was probably more an attempt to satisfy *amour propre* than to fill a real need.

It has always been with peculiar pleasure that Japan has been able to turn the tables on once proud western nations. Witness the 1914 note to Germany on the surrender of Kiaochow. In this the Japanese used the identical language of the German, French, and Russian notes to Japan over Port Arthur nineteen years before. Witness too the blockade of the British Concession in Tientsin in the summer of 1939 with the discriminatory treatment of British nationals as they waited in queues under the sweltering north China sun. It may well be that the long-smoldering resentment at western pretensions of superiority contributed to the Japanese decision to force the issue in 1941. Here if anywhere rests in considerable measure the responsibility of the United Nations for the present war. Japan is now engaged in a supreme effort to prove to the world her indisputable right to be classed as an equal to, if not a peer of the white nations.

Finally, the war originates in the conflicting national policies of Japan and the United Nations in the Far East and the world at large. The United Nations hold a considerable stake in the Far East. They are unwilling to surrender their rich possessions and jealously guard both raw materials and colonial markets through various restrictions. At the same time they have insisted upon equality of opportunity in trade with China. They maintain that their rights in China were gained by legal means and deserve both protection and preservation. Yet concern for China has been dictated by neither philanthropy nor business interests. Fundamentally much of the diplomacy of the last few decades has been predicated upon maintaining a free and independent China as a counterweight to Japan, and as the best assurance of a balance of power in the Orient. The Pacific powers felt that their safety would be in jeopardy

should Japan control the immense natural resources and endless human reserves of China.

There was a larger consideration too. In a burst of idealism the world had embarked upon a new era in 1919. Force was outlawed. The League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice were created as agencies to preserve the peace and to effect necessary changes in treaty structures. Such instruments as the Washington Treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were symbolic of the new international order. They had to be kept inviolate. Change by force was not to be sanctioned. Stimson's policy of non-recognition then was more than an attempt to thwart Japanese aims in Manchuria; it was an effort to preserve the whole peace machinery of the world before the new disintegrating forces. The United Nations felt that Japan's Manchurian venture was but the prototype of the aggressions that followed, and upon Japan fell the onus of the first real breach in the peace.

Japan, on the other hand, has opposed the contentions of the powers. Citing the doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus*, she has claimed that the Washington Treaties no longer apply to conditions in the Far East. As one of her great newspapers, the Tokyo *Nichi nichu* expressed it, "If the United States under the present-day East Asian situation, should try to insist upon the Nine-Power pact, she would be committing an anachronistic blunder more serious than that of claiming the Open Door."⁵ From Japan's point of view it was her peculiar mission to maintain the peace and order of East Asia. This was well stated by Foreign Minister Koki Hirota in the middle thirties:

The United States should keep her hands off Far Eastern affairs and place implicit confidence in Japan's efforts to maintain peace and order in Asia. The world should be divided into three parts, under the influence of American, European, and Asiatic Monroe Doctrines.⁶

The Japanese expansionists had convinced themselves that Japan's future development lay on the continent and that no foreign interference could be brooked. As an editorial in *Kokumin* expressed it, "The China continent is to Japan her life line, and on this national consciousness, Japan is pushing her new order construction."⁷ Japan's development in the past, they felt, had been thwarted by the powers. *Nichi nichu* claimed that the "greatest objective of the conclusion of the Nine-Power pact has been to check Japan's continental development," and that "the most blunt manifestation of this sinister move on the part of the United States was the enact-

⁵ Quoted in the *Japan times weekly*, III (August 10, 1939), 522.

⁶ Quoted in Carlos P. Romulo, "The Philippines look at Japan," *Foreign affairs*, XIV (April, 1936), 486.

⁷ Quoted in *Japan times weekly*, IV (September 28, 1939), 120.

ment of the 1924 anti-Japanese immigration law.”⁸ Foreign tariff barriers and quota restrictions leveled against Japanese manufactures were a further evidence of this determination to obstruct Japan’s growth. Japan seemed to run into interference upon every side.

The development denied to Japan in the world at large would therefore have to be sought in China. A great economic bloc of Japan, Manchukuo, and China should be created in which the constituent members would contribute harmoniously to the Japanese economy. To accomplish this China had to be kept weak and pliable. Nothing should be allowed to interfere with this scheme of continental development. Continued Chinese resistance to Japan was therefore blamed upon the western powers. The *Japan times weekly* even went so far as to claim that

it can be proved that had there been no western entanglements in the politico-military affairs of China before the Sino-Japanese Affair and during it, the two countries could have achieved an understanding without resort to arms. The Lytton Commission has been referred to as a device to keep the Japanese and Chinese from coming to an agreement.⁹

Loans to China and the furnishing of military supplies were anathema to the Japanese. They were determined to achieve their objective at all costs, and the Tokyo *Asahi* warned in September, 1939, that nothing would deter Japan’s action, “whether it be British, French or American influence.”¹⁰

Here then was a vital conflict of interest. On the one hand, the United Nations were adopting economic measures against Japan and insisting upon a strong and independent China. On the other, Japan felt that her legitimate national growth had been interfered with by the immigration restrictions, tariff walls, and quota arrangements of the United Nations. Moreover, her legitimate field of expansion, the Asiatic mainland, was disputed by the pretentious powers. Japan felt that she must risk all on the strength of her arms. To some in the military party China and East Asia were but a prelude in any event to the greater fields of conquest foretold in the famous Tanaka Memorial. Japan must be recognized as a vigorous and vital force, a nation on the ascendant. There was no turning back. The time had come to break the power of the British, the French, the Dutch, and the Americans in the Far East. As General Araki said in 1932:

The spirit of the Japanese nation is, by its nature, a thing that must be propagated over the seven seas and extended over the five continents. Anything that may hinder its progress must be abolished, even by force.¹¹

⁸ Quoted in *Japan times weekly*, III (August 10, 1939), 522.

⁹ *Japan times weekly*, VI (June 27, 1940), 298.

¹⁰ Quoted in *Japan times weekly*, IV (September 28, 1939), 119.

¹¹ Quoted in Romulo, *Foreign affairs*, XIV (April, 1936), 486.