

1964

## Favorite Sons: Obsolete Presidential Candidates

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### Recommended Citation

Davis, J. W. (1964). Favorite Sons: Obsolete Presidential Candidates. *Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science*, Vol. 31 No.2, 156-163.

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improvement of currently available photo interpretation systems.

The examples presented in this paper have, necessarily, been concerned primarily with forest resource photo interpretation. Let it be said, however, that workers in other area specialties are finding the potential uses of photo interpretation to be no less promising and intriguing. It will be a great pity, indeed, if we should continue to overlook the additional rewards inherent in its further development.

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## POLITICAL SCIENCE

### *Favorite Sons: Obsolete Presidential Candidates*

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With the 1964 national nominating conventions slightly more than a year away, nationwide political attention will once again be focused upon the presidential sweepstakes race. Inasmuch as the party controlling the presidency, the "in-party," almost never discards an incumbent, the president is virtually assured renomination by the Democrats; consequently politicians in both parties and the American voters will be concerned chiefly with the selection of the Republican candidate.

At this juncture it is impossible, of course, to predict flatly how many of the leading Republican contenders will openly toss their hats in the ring. But it is safe to assert now that no matter which candidate formally enters the race early next year, Republican organizations in several states, operating under a time-honored custom, will once again choose favorite son candidates to head their convention delegation. Unlike yesteryear, however, when favorite son candidates were frequently chosen as presidential candidates—and successfully elected—the favorite sons of 1964 and future presidential election years will not achieve the nomination prize. Why?

It will be the purpose of this paper to show that the changing forces in the presidential nominating process—especially the growing influence of the presidential primaries since World War II—have for all practical purposes ruled out the possibility of a favorite son ever again winning the party nomination at the national convention.

#### I

The declining influence of favorite son candidates has not sufficiently attracted the attention of political observ-

ers, although the trend has been observable for more than a generation. The last time a Republican national convention selected a favorite son candidate for president and elected him was in 1920 when Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio became the convention choice on the tenth ballot after the three leading contenders, Major General Leonard Wood, Illinois Governor Frank O. Lowden, and Senator Hiram Johnson of California, became hopelessly deadlocked. The Democratic party has not selected a favorite son presidential candidate since John W. Davis of West Virginia was chosen in 1924 on the 103rd ballot, following a ten-day balloting stalemate between New York's Governor Alfred E. Smith and Senator William Gibbs McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury in President Wilson's cabinet and son-in-law of the former president.

Before proceeding further, let us clarify the term "favorite son." In political parlance a favorite son is a home-state presidential aspirant who may or may not be a serious contender for the nomination. The types of favorite sons and the roles that they may perform can be classified generally into five categories:<sup>1</sup>

1. *Outstanding* favorite sons, who usually come from

<sup>1</sup> Material in this section is based, in considerable part, upon the discussion of favorite sons found in Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman (ed.), *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), I, 186-188. Additional information on favorite son candidates may be obtained in Clarence A. Berdahl, "Presidential Selection and Democratic Government," *Journal of Politics*, XI (February 1949), 35-40.

large pivotal states, are serious contenders when the field is wide open; their political influence and contacts extend considerably beyond their state borders.

2. *Rising* favorite sons are usually governors or prominent members of Congress who have gained prominence in their state. They are interested in spreading their names beyond their state border and usually are more concerned with future presidential elections, since they cannot be expected to compete on even terms with nationally-known candidates or outstanding favorite sons.

3. *Token* favorite sons, usually the state party leader, assume this role to demonstrate their control over the state party organization or to forestall rival faction encroachments upon their control of the party. They may wish to swing delegate support behind a particular candidate later.

4. *Stand-in* favorite sons, usually hand-picked by the state organizations, are selected to reflect the wishes of the party and are on the ticket because the presidential primary laws of such states, for example, Ohio, require that a candidate be listed.

5. *Nuisance* favorite sons are marginal candidates, sometimes lacking solid organizational support even in their own state. They have no chance of winning the nomination but crave the publicity that attends their entry in the presidential race. Occasionally these candidates cast themselves in the role of "spoilers," that is, they try to prevent front-running candidates from obtaining a clear victory in a primary contest.

Examining these categories in more detail, the outstanding favorite sons usually enter one or more presidential primaries outside of their state as part of their quest for the nomination. While the outstanding favorite sons are not front-runners, they are well up in the pack, within striking distance of the nomination in the event a convention deadlock develops between two front-running candidates. For example, Governor Earl Warren, California's outstanding favorite son in 1952 (and now Chief Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court), would have been in an excellent position for the nomination if a deadlock had occurred between General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Senator Robert A. Taft. In 1948 Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Michigan's outstanding favorite son, who declined to campaign actively for the nomination, was considered by a number of observers to have been the logical compromise if Governor Thomas E. Dewey and Senator Taft had become stalemated.

Since the outstanding favorite son almost invariably comes from a large pivotal state, he has a block of delegates to serve as the nucleus for a home-stretch drive. The outstanding favorite son usually has been acquainted with other important state leaders who in the past have been willing under certain circumstances to assist his candidacy rather than see the convention bogged down in a deadlock. The chief handicap of most outstanding sons, however, has been their lack of nationwide organization to compete on even terms with a nationally-known candidate.

Rising favorite sons are usually privy to the inner

councils of the party professionals, but lacking full stature, comprise the second team of presidential candidates. Front-running candidates treat them with respect and, in turn, expect the rising favorite son to step aside when the smaller islands of delegates began breaking up and gravitating toward the nationally-known candidates. This works no great hardship on the rising favorite son. He has had the opportunity to bask in the limelight of the convention, be wooed by the national candidate's political managers, or be promised certain political favors in the event of the nationally-known candidate's successful election. He may even be considered as a "long-shot" vice presidential candidate. The rising favorite son is given an opportunity to test his political wings; the party professionals may mark him down in their books as a future national contender. Or, more likely, the rising favorite son may never reach those dreamed-of heights and be forever consigned to the second team or destined to political oblivion. Democratic Governor of New Jersey, Robert B. Meyner, in 1956 would belong to this category.

Token favorite sons are usually veteran party leaders who wish to be in a position to exert powerful influence in the choice of the party nominee. The token favorite son maintains tight control over his delegation so that he will be in a position to swing behind the candidate he considers best-qualified as the party's vote-getter in November. If he wishes, he may serve as a stalking horse for a leading presidential contender who needs to have his support of the delegation at a vital point in the balloting. The token candidate is almost never in the thick of presidential contention. For a variety of reasons, he is not politically "available"—he may come from a "safe" Republican or Democratic state, be too told, tarnished with the boss label, too closely identified with a large pressure group, or unacceptable to important minority groups. Governor George Docking of Kansas in 1960 would undoubtedly belong in this category.

Stand-in favorite sons are largely products of certain presidential primary laws and are never serious contenders for the nomination. Stand-in candidates are entered to comply with filing requirements which include the consent of presidential candidates to enter. Delegates in these states are usually formally pledged to a presidential candidate. In some instances stand-in favorite sons are also used by incumbent presidents who, either for reasons of health or political expediency, do not wish to announce their intentions. In the case of President Truman in 1952, a stand-in favorite son was used in the Minnesota primary (Senator Hubert H. Humphrey) until the President finally made up his mind not to seek re-election. When President Truman asked that his name be withdrawn from the California presidential primary, Attorney General Edmund G. "Pat" Brown—now Governor Brown—was pressured by the state organization to serve as the Democratic stand-in candidate to keep Senator Estes Kefauver from winning the primary by default. Governor Brown, who has since turned back the challenge of former Vice President Richard M. Nixon and been re-elected governor of the largest state in the Union,

can of course no longer be considered merely a stand-in candidate. If next year were 1968, Governor Brown would be, at the very least, an outstanding favorite son and conceivably a leading contender for the nomination.

Nuisance favorite son candidates, the fifth and final category, are usually unknown to most American voters. Who, for example, could identify Riley Bender, favorite son candidate for president in the 1944 Illinois Republican primary and preference winner in the 1948 Republican primary? Driven more by pure egotism and the desire for publicity than a willingness or ability to organize a full-fledged campaign, the nuisance candidates rarely cause sleepless nights for front-running candidates. Although the nuisance candidates are often the first to admit that they have no possibility of winning the nomination, they sometimes delight in assuming the "spoiler" role. For example, Democratic Senator Wayne B. Morse of Oregon waged a "stop-Kennedy" crusade throughout the 1960 presidential primary campaign. He singled out the Massachusetts senator for his "reactionary" voting record, especially his vote supporting the Landrum-Griffin labor reform law. Yet, Morse was the first to concede that his chances for the nomination were hopeless. Undoubtedly as long as there are presidential primary laws, there will be nuisance favorite son candidates, but they will never be considered as having any more possibility of becoming president than the average voter does.

## II

The emergence of the favorite son candidate antedates the rise of the progressive-inspired presidential primary movement, the first significant change in the presidential nominating process since the founding of the national party conventions in the 1830's. But it has been the presidential primary system itself that has modified and, more recently, changed the role of the favorite son. The original and avowed purpose of the presidential primary system was to take the power of nominating presidential candidates out of the hands of the party leaders and bosses and put it into the hands of the rank and file voters. Yet, despite the determination of the progressives to reduce boss control of presidential nominations through the use of the presidential primary, party leaders in a number of primary states were able to outmaneuver the reformers by watering down the provisions of the primary laws.<sup>2</sup> Through use of candidate consent statements and by eliminating the delegate's formal pledges of support to a presidential candidate, the party leaders emasculated the primary laws in a number of states. The net effect of these revisions was to discourage many presidential aspirants from entering these primaries. Instead of providing the voters with an opportunity to choose between leading presidential contenders, the amended primary laws spawned a new host of favorite son candidates. This development has persisted in some states to the present time. In Ohio, for example, the list of stand-in favorite sons in the Democratic party for the period 1940-1956 included: former Lieutenant Governor

<sup>2</sup>Louise Overacker, *The Presidential Primary* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1926), pp. 17-22.

Charles Sawyer (1940); State Auditor Joseph T. Ferguson (1944); Treasurer of the United States William A. Julian (1948); former U. S. Senator Robert J. Bulkley (1952); and Governor (now Senator) Frank Lausche (1956). Indeed, Professor Berdahl tells us that the favorite son technique has been developed into such an art in Ohio that the decision to enter a favorite son slate has even been made before any specific person has been agreed upon to head the delegation.<sup>3</sup>

By endorsing a favorite son in the primary the state party organizations have frequently been able to frighten away a front-running candidate from entering the presidential primary. The purpose of this action, of course, is to cut down the front-runner to size, with the view of enhancing the state party organization's bargaining in the event of a convention deadlock, and perhaps even nominating the home state favorite son or a compromise candidate. Also, the state organization may desire to extract certain concessions from the front-runner before switching support to him. In some instances the state party organization may choose and support a favorite son in order to avoid a divisive conflict between rival local supporters of leading presidential candidates. Under other circumstances the state party leaders may be undecided on which candidate they wish to support. By putting up a favorite son candidate, the organization can establish a holding operation until convention time. Meanwhile, the party leaders can observe the results of other presidential primary contests and state conventions and watch the public opinion polls in unhurried fashion.

Since the beginning of the presidential primary era, the prevailing view of presidential candidates and political commentators alike has been that it is a dangerous practice to challenge the favorite son candidates. According to these sources, the price in terms of favorite and state organizational opposition to the invading challenger — and possibly apprehension that the state organization may attempt to "throw" the general election to the rival party should the challenger win the nomination — is more than most presidential aspirants are willing to pay.

## III

The favorite son strategy of state party organizations confronts the leading presidential candidates with a dilemma of the first order. Shall the nationally-known challenger risk a shattering defeat at the hands of the state party organization by permitting the state organization to frighten him away with the threat of a fight in the primary and, in effect, swindle him out of possible delegate support in the state? Or shall the nationally-known candidate roll up his sleeves and prepare to fight the state organization in the primary? That seasoned presidential campaigners recognize the inherent danger of challenging favorite sons may be deduced from the scant number of presidential contenders, only six, who have been willing to gamble their nomination chances on this strategy. Not only do most presidential candidates wish to avoid alienating the favorite son and his state organization (and thus risk losing possible second choice support at the

<sup>3</sup>Berdahl, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

national convention when the favorite son drops out of the race), but there is also the haunting fear that the gamble will fail and the invading presidential candidate will suffer a needless—and possibly disastrous—defeat that could have been avoided merely by staying out of the fray.

The first presidential candidate to get his nose bloodied in a favorite son primary battle was Major General Leonard E. Wood in the historic 1920 Republican nominating race. Despite the advice of experienced politicians, General Wood and his managers decided to invade Illinois and challenge Governor Frank O. Lowden, the favorite son. Wood campaigned vigorously up and down the state. Governor Lowden, on the other hand, refused to campaign openly on the grounds that if he could not win his home state primary on his record as governor, he should not be a candidate.<sup>4</sup> Despite the expenditure of more than \$300,000 by the Wood forces in the state, Governor Lowden won handily, 236,802 votes to Wood's 156,719. This was lesson number one. Still undaunted, General Wood and his political advisers decided to move into Ohio and challenge the Buckeye State's favorite son, Senator Warren G. Harding. Once again, the Wood forces spent lavishly and enjoyed the backing of the late Theodore Roosevelt's sizeable following in Ohio; yet Harding won, 123,257 votes to 108,565. Even though General Wood captured nine of Ohio's forty-eight delegates and succeeded in defeating Harding's campaign manager, Harry M. Daughtery, in one of the delegate contests, this was small consolation because Wood's tactics intensified the hostility of party regulars in Ohio and elsewhere to his candidacy.<sup>5</sup>

Wood was generally regarded as the front-runner throughout the primary, but he had been unable to crack the favorite son barrier. He led in the early convention balloting with a high of 314½ votes (less than one-third of the convention vote) on the fourth ballot, but lost the nomination on the tenth ballot to Harding, a compromise choice of Republican organizational leaders.

Between 1928 and 1960 five presidential candidates—Herbert Hoover, William E. Borah, Harold E. Stassen, and Estes Kefauver and John F. Kennedy—mustered enough courage to tackle favorite son candidates on their homeground. Yet only two of these candidates, Hoover and Kennedy, received the nomination. But does this necessarily mean that challenging a favorite son is always foolhardy or bad politics? The reasons for the failure of Borah, Stassen, and Kefauver to win the nomination were much more deep-seated and existed before these men decided to flaunt the time-honored tradition of avoiding direct challenges to favorite sons. All three of these candidates were unacceptable to prominent factions in their party and lacked solid organizational support in a large number of states using party conventions to elect delegates. Hoover and Kennedy, with much

stronger personal organizations, adequate finances, and a solid base of delegate strength in the convention states were able to turn their challenges of favorite son candidates into positive assets. Each of these candidacies deserves brief mention.

Herbert Hoover, anxious to step beyond the shadows of being merely a Cabinet member for President Coolidge and thwart the opposing stalwart Republican coalition leaders before they blocked his road to the nomination, did not hesitate to let his name be entered against three favorite son candidates—Senators Frank Willis, Ohio; James Watson, Indiana; and Guy D. Goff, West Virginia. Although Hoover collected some battle scars in these three bouts, he achieved part of his objective of demonstrating his popular appeal in unfriendly territory and flashing a warning to the uncommitted delegates to jump onto his fast-moving bandwagon before it was too late. In Ohio Hoover captured thirty-one delegates, including all seven delegates-at-large, out of the fifty-one-member Ohio delegation. This was done in spite of the fact that the Willis machine controlled the Republican organization in eighty out of eighty-eight counties. Hoover's margin of victory came from the large cities—he carried Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Toledo by a three to one vote.<sup>6</sup> Even though he lost the Indiana and West Virginia primaries by narrow margins, Hoover's vote-getting ability in the urban areas impressed a number of eastern Republican strategists who had been fearful that he would be no match for the popular New York Governor Alfred E. Smith in the big cities.

In 1936 cantankerous Republican Senator William E. Borah, Idaho's stentorian voice in Washington, entered the presidential race more to express his disapproval of the organizational forces backing Kansas Governor Alfred M. Landon than with hope of winning the nomination. Borah, after primary victories in Wisconsin and a narrow defeat against Colonel Frank Knox in Illinois, challenged the Ohio Republican organization's slate, headed by its favorite son, young Robert A. Taft, then a state senator. But Borah collected only five delegates out of the 52-member delegation. Borah's overwhelming defeat in the New Jersey primary, which followed on the heels of his Ohio defeat, was the final blow to his candidacy. The Idaho senator's advancing age—he was approaching his seventieth birthday—was also a factor in the party's rejection of his candidacy.

Twelve years later, former Minnesota Governor Harold E. Stassen's spectacular bid for the presidential nomination also received a serious jolt in the Ohio primary when he unsuccessfully challenged Ohio's same favorite son, Robert A. Taft, now a United States Senator. Although Stassen had run up a string of primary victories in Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania, he captured only nine delegates out of the 53-member Ohio delegation in a straight delegate contest. Stassen's weak showing in Ohio plus his defeat at the hands of New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey in the Oregon primary, the final "trial heat" of the 1948 nominating campaign, destroyed

<sup>4</sup> Wesley M. Bagby, *The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1920* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 51.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Indianapolis Star*, April 26, 1928.

any hope of his winning the nomination. In 1952 Stassen attempted again to get his candidacy off the ground in Ohio by challenging Taft and his favorite son slate, but this time he failed to win a single delegate! After this defeat Stassen was no longer considered a serious contender for the nomination.

In the 1952 Democratic pre-convention race Senator Estes Kefauver, aided by a split in the Ohio Democratic organization, was able to win half of the fifty-two pledged delegates in a race against the Ohio favorite son, former Senator Robert J. Bulkley. Kefauver also captured the pledged California delegation by defeating stand-in-favorite son, Attorney General Edmund G. "Pat" Brown. These two victories against the favorite sons gave Kefauver's candidacy a powerful boost, but not enough to overcome the combined opposition of the northern city Democratic leaders and the conservative Southern bloc. The main conclusion to be drawn from Kefauver's 1952 pre-convention campaign is that successful challenges against favorite sons alone are not enough to win the nomination. Four years later Kefauver made a second bid for the nomination, but this time he found the doors closed to him in the favorite son states. He stayed away from Ohio, where the rival factions had become reconciled. In California he faced Adlai E. Stevenson, instead of a favorite son, and lost decisively. In the only clear-cut favorite son contest, New Jersey, Kefauver won only one-half delegate vote to favorite son Governor Robert B. Meyner's thirty-one and one-half votes. The harsh fact that favorite son candidates can be a mountainous barrier to the nomination was brought home to Kefauver all too clearly in the 1956 pre-convention campaign.

The most adroit job of handling favorite son candidates was done by President John F. Kennedy, then U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, in the 1960 pre-convention campaign. Well aware that only bold tactics would enable him to overcome the handicap of his youth, his Roman Catholic religion, and early lack of support from the northern city Democratic leaders, Kennedy scored one of his biggest pre-convention coups in Ohio against the threatened favorite son candidacy of Governor Michael V. DiSalle. By late December, 1959, Governor DiSalle's lieutenants had lined up support in approximately four-fifths of Ohio's eighty-eight counties. This show of force was expected to keep Senator Kennedy out of the Ohio presidential primary. But Kennedy, riding the crest of a national publicity wave, with a solid bloc of New England delegates, ample funds, and a well-organized staff, decided to gamble on an Ohio invasion. He had some strength in Ohio, and he needed an early, spectacular victory in a pivotal industrial state before embarking on the presidential primary trail. Kennedy also had a secret weapon—a possible alliance with Ray T. Miller, the dissident Democratic leader of Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), who had been at odds with DiSalle.<sup>7</sup> Fearful that a Kennedy-Miller team slate might win over his favorite son ticket, or at least badly split

<sup>7</sup> William H. Hessler, "How Kennedy Took Ohio," *The Reporter*, XXII (March 3, 1960), p. 21.

the delegation, and not desiring to give his rival Miller an opening, DiSalle capitulated after quickly surveying the state once more. All of this activity had been going on behind the scenes. To the amazement of most nationwide political observers, DiSalle announced on January 5, 1960, "I will be a candidate for favorite son committed to the candidacy of Senator John F. Kennedy."<sup>8</sup> This quick, silent victory enabled the Kennedy forces to pocket the sixty-four-vote Ohio delegation, the fifth largest in the country, and freeze out the Symington, Stevenson, Humphrey, and Johnson advance elements before they had completed their pre-primary election surveys. Kennedy's bold stroke also saved him an expensive, hard-fought campaign in the primary.

Senator Kennedy displayed the same rough-and-tumble tactics in Maryland against Governor Millar Tawes, the proposed favorite son. It had been Tawes' original plan to head an "uninstructed" delegation. But the imminent threat that the popular Massachusetts Senator might come into Maryland to campaign against Tawes was enough in late January, 1960, to dissuade the Maryland governor from running.<sup>9</sup> Shortly thereafter Kennedy formally announced in Annapolis his entry in the Maryland primary. Governor Tawes continued to rebuff the Kennedy clan's blandishments for a formal endorsement until the final week of the primary campaign, although a number of influential members of his administration had been openly supporting Kennedy. The governor's belated endorsement no doubt helped reduce the possibility of the Maryland Democratic organization voting for an uncommitted delegation or one of Kennedy's rivals in the primary. Senator Kennedy was opposed by Senator Wayne B. Morse, the Oregon legislator who maintains a stock farm in suburban Montgomery County, next to Washington, D.C., and two perennial candidates, Andrew J. Easter of Baltimore and Lar Daly, a Chicago manufacturer. All three of Kennedy's opponents were swamped by the Kennedy deluge of votes, which totaled over 70% of the ballots cast.

Senator Kennedy also tangled with Senator Morse, running as a favorite son, in the latter's home-state presidential primary. Kennedy's main campaign theme in the Oregon primary was: "Don't waste a vote by voting for a favorite son who cannot be nominated."<sup>10</sup> The Oregon voters apparently agreed, for Kennedy outpointed Morse 146,332 votes to 91,715. Morse's defeat underscored a new basic principle of nominating politics: a nationally-known presidential candidate is an almost certain winner in a primary in which his only active opposition is a favorite son with no serious chance of winning the nomination. As one careful observer noted: "Senator Morse was really asking the voters of Oregon to give him authority at the convention to be used at the discretion of the delegates who might thus play the role of kingmakers. The difficulty with the Morse position was that the voters could themselves be kingmakers in the primary

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *New York Times*, January 25, 1960.

<sup>10</sup> *New York Times*, May 19, 1960.

by voting for one of the major candidates."<sup>11</sup> Senator Morse, recognizing the futility of his position, withdrew from the presidential race less than twenty-four hours after the Oregon returns were in.

Like a good poker player, Senator Kennedy decided not to push his luck too far in challenging favorite sons. He avoided open fights in California, Florida, and New Jersey. Before deciding not to enter the California primary, however, he engaged in some heavy psychological warfare against Governor Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, California's favorite son. Governor Brown reportedly threatened Kennedy with the loss of California in the general election if the Massachusetts senator entered the primary against Brown. But Kennedy refused to knuckle under to this threat. Twice in January, 1960, Senator Kennedy announced he was still studying the possibility of entering the California primary. On March 1, as the filing date (March 9) approached, he denied that he had made up his mind not to run in California. Kennedy said that no decision would be made for a week, but he indicated that he would probably enter because he felt confident that he could defeat Governor Brown. Suddenly, on March 2, Senator Kennedy announced that he would not enter the California primary.<sup>12</sup> Kennedy said "a desire for party unity in California" was his reason. However, it was rumored that his real reason for not entering was that he had worked out an agreement with Brown whereby the California governor agreed to a policy of presidential candidate neutrality before the convention and also to include a substantial number of Kennedy supporters in the California delegation.<sup>13</sup> (It may be worth recalling that Senator Kennedy received thirty-three and one-half votes from the eighty-one-member delegation on the first and only ballot at the convention.)

Senator Kennedy also decided to avoid a favorite son contest against Governor Robert B. Meyner in New Jersey. With heavy second choice support among New Jersey Democrats, Kennedy felt that little was to be gained by adding this primary fight to his campaign. The Massachusetts senator had reaped handsome dividends from his forays in Ohio and Maryland; therefore, it was scarcely necessary to take on the additional burden of this primary. In Florida where Senator George Smathers, a personal friend of Kennedy's, was leading a favorite son delegation, Kennedy had protected his flanks by blocking out several other contenders from this race. According to one source, he agreed to stay out of Florida, but let it be understood that he would enter the Sunshine State primary if either Senators Lyndon B. Johnson or Stuart Symington entered.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Howard Penniman, "Primary Teachers," *America*, CIII (June 18, 1960), p. 369. Under Oregon law the national convention delegates are pledged to support the winner of the preference primary until such candidate receives less than 35 per cent of the votes for nomination by the national convention, releases the delegates from their pledge, or until two nominating ballots have been taken. *Oregon Revised Statutes* (1959), paragraph 249.210.

<sup>12</sup> *New York Times*, March 3, 1960.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Paul T. David (ed.), *The Presidential Election and Transitions*, Volume Thirty-one, No. 2, 1964

Judging from these recent examples, it would appear that the nationally-known candidates, not the favorite sons, are coming to dictate the strategy and course of the nominating race.

#### IV

Abolition of the Democratic party's historic two-thirds rule, that is, the requirement that the party nominee obtain two-thirds of the convention vote to be nominated also marked a turning point in the role performed by Democratic favorite sons. Prior to 1936, it was the standard practice of state party organizations to put up a favorite son candidate, since the two-thirds rule made it relatively easy to block the front-running candidate with a host of favorite sons.

A review of the Democratic national convention before and after 1936 reflects rather clearly the influence of the two-thirds rule upon the number of favorite sons nominated at the national conclave. Table A below shows a large number of favorite son candidates contesting in the balloting between 1920 and 1936 and a perceptible drop after that date in those presidential election years when the Democrats have been the out-party or when an "open" convention race has existed.

TABLE A: Democratic Favorite Son Candidates Polling 15 Votes or More at National Conventions (First Ballot Only) When Democrats Have Been the Out-Party or When an "Open" Convention Race Has Existed.

(1920-1960)	
Year	No. of Favorite Son Candidates
1920	11
1924	10
1928	10
1932	6
1952	5
1956	5
1960	3

Table B below shows a corresponding drop in the number of Republican favorite son candidates during the same period, but for other reasons that apply both to Republican and Democratic candidates in the present era of presidential primaries, mass communications, and public opinion polls.

The declining number of favorite son candidates re-

TABLE B: Republican Favorite Son Candidates Polling 15 Votes or More at National Conventions (First Ballot Only) When Republicans Have Been the Out-Party or When an "Open" Convention Race Has Existed.

(1920-1960)	
Year	No. of Favorite Son Candidates
1920	7
1936	*
1940	6
1944	*
1948	4
1952	2

\* Only one candidate nominated at convention.

*tion 1960-1961* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1961), pp. 8-9.

flects the gradual "nationalizing" of presidential politics and the steady increase in the number of two-party states. Favorite sons who represent state or sectional interests no longer possess serious appeal to convention delegates. The intense competition between Republicans and Democrats for the presidency in many of the pivotal two-party states has caused the state party leaders to look for presidential candidates who will appeal strongly to the mass groups of laborers, suburbanites, and ethnic minorities in the heavily urbanized states. The state party leaders and convention delegates alike have ceased for the most part to be preoccupied with selecting favorite sons to barter and bargain with at the convention. Instead, the leaders and their delegates are looking ahead to winning the general election with a well-known presidential candidate who has demonstrated vote-getting ability in the primaries and who they believe can help carry the state and local tickets in November. Favorite sons are becoming the forgotten men in American politics. No wonder California's prospective favorite son for the 1960 Democratic convention, Governor Edmund G. "Pat" Brown lamented to a national columnist in 1959: "Nobody outside of California has ever heard of Pat Brown . . . And if nobody's ever heard of you, how the hell do you become a serious presidential candidate?" Brown added wistfully: "If only I could change places with Nelson Rockefeller!"<sup>15</sup>

Speaking of the future role of the favorite son, Professor William G. Carleton has remarked: "The days of the favorite son . . . are numbered, if indeed they are not already finished."<sup>16</sup> Insofar as winning the presidential nomination, the evidence of the presidential nominating conventions since 1936 convincingly supports this judgment. This development represents a complete turn-about of national convention patterns, for prior to the Great Depression the nomination of favorite sons or "dark horses" was a common practice. Since then, no favorite son has come close to winning the nomination against the popular, nationally-known candidates such as Hoover, Roosevelt, Dewey, Eisenhower, Stevenson (1956), or Kennedy.

The mass media ignore the favorite son candidates. Instead, the newspaper, television, radio, and news magazine media, which have assumed a vital publicity role in the presidential nominating process of this vast country, concentrate their coverage upon the presidential primary contests of nationally-known candidates, who may be the Vice President of the United States, an outstanding Senator, or a popular military hero. The press services build up the nationally-known candidate and thus make him even better known or identified to the average voter. Television and radio networks compete with each other to carry into millions of homes the nationally-known contenders on their "meet the press" interview programs. Because the nationally-known candidate commands read-

<sup>15</sup> "How Now, Brown?" *Time*, LXXIV (October 26, 1959), p. 14.

<sup>16</sup> William G. Carleton, "The Revolution in the Presidential Nominating Convention," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXII (June, 1957), p. 224.

er attention, the mass circulation magazines carry frequent political sketches and human interest stories, liberally sprinkled with smiling photographs of the candidate and his family.<sup>17</sup>

Public opinion polls on the "trial heat" contests between the leading rivals for the presidential nomination have also become important barometers for measuring the candidates presidential stock. The leadership spot in the polls may have a more important bearing on the convention outcome than the support of a favorite son delegation. Favorite son candidates are usually rated so low in these polls that the average reader may see their names for the first time in the poll results.

In the middle of the twentieth century favorite son candidates are also becoming overshadowed, if they have not already been dwarfed, by the recurring international crises and national emergencies which have shifted attention away from the individual states. How many favorite sons, for example, have had an interview with Premier Khrushchev?

As a result of these changing developments in American politics, the only manner in which the favorite son can hope to compete under this system is to attempt to break out of the favorite son shell and become a nationally-known personage in his own right, which of course has the effect of removing him from the parochialism of the favorite son category.

## V

In summarizing, it seems fair to predict, first, that the general trend of presidential nominating politics will be against selecting favorite sons as party nominees. The handwriting is on the wall: favorite sons will continue to persist under the present nominating system, but their chances of winning the presidential nomination will be almost nil. Secondly, although challenging favorite sons continues to entail heavy risk and may even stall or wreck the presidential aspirations of the challenger, a strong, nationally-known candidate, backed with good organization, ample funds, and a beachhead of support from a prominent faction in the state may be more than a match for the favorite son. Herbert Hoover was the first candidate to use this strong-arm form of campaigning with considerable success in 1928, although he did not personally campaign in the favorite son states. Senator Estes Kefauver in 1952 used this campaign tactic with some success but did not win the nomination because he was unable to overcome opposition from several

<sup>17</sup> Edward L. Berneys, editor of a manual on public relations techniques—*Engineering of Consent*—lists the following channels of communication existing in the United States today:

- 1,800 daily newspapers
- 10,000 weekly newspapers
- 7,600 magazines
- 2,000 trade journals
- 7,635 periodicals geared to ethnic groups
- 100,000,000 radio sets
- 12,000,000 television sets
- 15,000 motion-picture houses
- 6,000 house organs

Quoted by Vance Packard, *The Hidden Persuaders* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 216-217.

major power factions in the Democratic party before and at the national convention. Convincing proof that challenging the favorite sons can help springboard a challenger to the nomination was still lacking until Senator John F. Kennedy came along and used this campaign device with astounding success in the 1960 pre-convention race.

Kennedy demonstrated that challenging favorite sons or threatening to challenge them in the presidential primaries can serve several purposes: (a) frighten favorite sons into supporting a nationally-known challenger without a primary fight; (b) win concessions for the challenger in the form of a sizeable delegation on a favorite son's state delegation to the national convention; (c) keep other prospective challengers away from a favorite son who may give strong second ballot support to the nationally-known candidate; and, most important of all, (d) demonstrate to the uncommitted state delegations powerful vote-getting support under actual election campaign conditions; in other words, create a winning "image" that helps nail down the nomination.

As the front-running candidates become more audacious in challenging favorite sons, the presidential primary laws such as those of California and Ohio will take on a new look and may again assume the importance that

their original proponents intended. Genuine popularity contests between leading contenders will become an established practice again in these states because the stringent filing requirements that the party legislative leaders wrote into the laws to frighten away out-of-state challengers will no longer be a major roadblock to these challengers. The nationally-known candidates now have the weapons — the presidential primaries, the mass news media, the public opinion polls — to attack the favorite son citadels. Instead of the state party leaders using the presidential primary law and the favorite son gambit as a barrier to keep the front-runners away, these front-runners can be expected to turn around and use the presidential primary popularity contest to beat down the favorite son threat.

One aspect of the presidential nominating pattern, then, seems clear. Favorite son candidates are obsolete in the fast-moving nationwide presidential nominating politics of the post-World War II period. While it can be expected that this type of candidate will continue to be nominated in some states, the inescapable conclusion of this paper is that favorite sons will seldom play a crucial role any longer in determining the outcome of presidential nominations.