Russia’s Use of the Energy Weapon: How Russia Manipulates Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States

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Abstract

Russia’s stranglehold on oil and gas as a resource, and use of energy as a weapon is a long standing humanitarian crisis as shown by the cut off of oil exports to former Soviet Republics, in efforts to gain political and economic dependence, resulting in, as one example shows, electricity and heat suspensions of innocent citizens homes. Other concerted efforts of Moscow include control over export routes, the attempt to reinstate the Soviet Union, and the intimidation of the Western World. The Soviet Union may have collapsed, but the drive for state control over resources, people, and land did not. The only cure for the former Soviet Republic victims of Russia’s manipulation and coercion is through energy independence.
Introduction

A major power using a natural resource as crucial as oil and/or gas as leverage against other countries is dangerous and can lead to political, economic, and social turmoil. It is widely known that Russia is considered to be a nation with low regard for following ethical norms. An example of this is freedom of speech, whereas journalists and news reporters in the nation must adhere to the Kremlin's standards. Because of this, proper and truthful coverage of Russian news, and specifically Russian foreign relations does not exist from within. However, just because Russia isn’t talking about it doesn’t mean it isn’t important; In fact, it is argued to be quite the opposite. The lack of proper coverage of what goes on within the walls of Moscow begs for outside analysis. Because of this, most covering of the topic of Russia and their use of energy as a weapon is done by European journalists and news sites. The British Broadcasting Corporation, more commonly known as BBC, has extensively covered the goings on between Russia and Ukraine, Georgia and the Baltic States, as well as the idea of Russia using energy as a weapon, leaving room for a critical analysis of how these instances interact with each other and a larger scale theoretical and empirical critique of Moscow’s strategic vision. This paper will investigate if Russia has established use of energy as a weapon; the most notable cases of Russia manipulating other States; the effects of this on Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States; Russia’s goals of using energy as a weapon; if Russia’s goals remain constant or differ case by case, and whether or not Russia has been successful in achieving their strategic goals.

“Energy Weapon”, for the purpose of this analysis, defines the use of oil and/or gas as a mechanism to strategically manipulate nations into political, economic, or social dependence on another nation. In this study, “Energy Weapon” is referring to a Russian apparatus used as an exploitative tactic against Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States. There are two main ways that
Russia uses its Energy Weapon. The first is through “Price Manipulation”, also known as Market manipulation, which is defined as a deliberate attempt to interfere with the free and fair operation of the market and create artificial, false or misleading appearances with respect to the price of, or market for, a product, security, commodity or currency. The second strategy Russia utilizes its Energy Weapon by is “Coercion”, defined as the practice of persuading someone to do something by using force or threats.

This paper will begin by outlining the methods used for the analysis of the topic, explaining how the research was gathered, how it was put together, and how it interacts with each other to form a comprehensive analysis. It will then move into a Literature Review, where the sources of the analysis are discussed on a case by case basis, i.e., Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania being one case). Later, there will be a discussion and comparison of the three cases, outlining how they interact with each other and similarities and differences between them, while providing a fresh perspective on the topic. Last, a conclusion of the topic will be set. To get from here to there, I hypothesize that Russia’s stranglehold on oil and gas as a resource, and use of energy as a weapon against Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States is a long standing humanitarian crisis lending itself to political unrest, which can only be cured with the energy independence of former Soviet Republics.
Methods

Comparative case studies involve the analysis and synthesis of the similarities, differences and patterns across two or more cases that share a common focus or goal in a way that produces knowledge that is easier to generalize about causal questions. This is a comparison of how Russia uses energy as a weapon against Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States, and a comparison of the different ways and excuses Moscow uses for its shut off of oil supply. This paper will analyze the three “States” to conclude if Russia uses different methods with each, or if Russia has separate goals within each. There are five Russian strategic goals outlined in this paper: To gain back the dependence of former Soviet States; To be the sole proprietor of oil and gas in the near Eurasian region; To have state control over export routes of gas and oil; To ever expand their power, both economically, politically, and socially; and to intimidate the Western World. This comparative case study is conducted through analysis of news articles and journals covering the real time news of Russian foreign relations in reference to Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States. A fault of this, is that most of the sources used for this case study are not academic sources, and therefore could be considered not empirical evidence. However, because of the nature of my analysis, and the call for a near primary idea of how Russia uses energy as a weapon, news articles and journals from first hand accounts actually become the best sources to be used. It was possible, then, to lay out all of the instances Russia manipulated or coerced the nations in the three cases, and concert an original idea for why this is important and how Russia was able to get away with it.
Literature Review

Ukraine

When researching Russian foreign relations, the relationship with Ukraine is one of the most prominently covered. There are many dynamics to the foreign relations between the two countries, many of which lie in the fact that Russia has never been critical in hiding the want for Ukraine to be a part of the Soviet Union again (Jackson, 2014). With this in mind, it is easy to brush this topic in relation to Ukraine aside for what could be deemed as more important, as the relationship extends far past the discussion of energy manipulation seen in this analysis. However, it could be argued that this makes it that much more important to cover Ukraine as a victim of Russia’s Energy Weapon.

In 1992 and 1993, Russia suspended Gazprom, Russia’s main gas company that provides to Ukraine, gas exports several times to Ukraine. This suspension was a result of disputes over “non-payment by Ukraine” for their gas imports and usage. Then Russian President Boris Yeltsin offered Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk a forgiveness of Ukraine’s debts in exchange for control of the Black Sea fleet, a strategic geographical area for Russian export, as well as control of Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal. Kravchuk declined the offer and it was then abandoned (Pirani, 2007). Negotiations continued between Russia and Ukraine on ways to continue gas exports, with plans for creation of a joint company, namely Gaz Transit, in which Gazprom would hold a 51% stake. Ultimately, the chance for exchange ended with Ukraine adopting a law prohibiting the privatization of oil and gas assets in 1995. This is important, because it signifies Ukraine standing strong to their values and persistence in remaining a sovereign state.
Ten years later, Ukraine and Russia were negotiating gas prices for the upcoming year, and a conclusion was deemed impossible to come as Ukraine demanded fair market prices, and Russia refused to oblige. Then, in May of 2005 it was discovered that 7.8 billion cubic metres of gas deposited by Gazprom to Ukraine in the previous winter had not been made available to the company. At this point in time, it was unclear if it was missing or stolen, and to this day there is no real explanation of where it disappeared to. By the first of January, 2006, Gazprom started reducing the pressure in the pipelines from Russia to Ukraine (Int’l Herald Tribune, 2006). This forced Ukraine’s hand in negotiations, with Ukraine resolving to sign a five year gas contract, with set prices for the next six months (BBC, Ukraine and Russia reach gas deal, 2008). The supply was then restored on January 4th of 2006 (Stearn, 2006).

Just a few years later in 2007, the two countries found themselves at a standstill yet again. Ukraine owed Gazprom for gas they had already used and Russia denied exports until Ukraine paid the entire debt plus penalties (BBC, 2008). The two reach a negotiation to pay back the debt owed, and set a price for the upcoming year, (UNIAN, 2008) but it is not long before threats occur again. The Ukrainian government said they had paid their debts from 2007, but Moscow said otherwise and threatened to reduce supply of gas to Ukraine yet again, beginning March 3rd of 2008 (BBC, 2008). Supply was cut by 25% on March 3rd and another 25% the next day, March 4th. The two presidents came to an agreement over the phone, restoring gas supply fully on March 5th, but the next day the Ukrainian parliament refused to oblige, resulting in UkrGazEnergo no longer operating in Ukraine's domestic gas market (Tymoshenko, 2008). The next two years were spent arguing about whether or not the debt was paid and future gas prices,
while Russia turned gas supplies on and off depending on the state of negotiations. This happened so frequently that it has not been calculated how many times the gas supply was shut off (Reuters, 2009).

Fast forward to February of 2014; the annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula. Russia wanted to claim ‘back’ Crimea as Russian soil, and used their energy export advantage to try and coerce Ukraine to submit to the political split. Naftogaz, a state-owned gas company made a pipeline access deal with Slovakian company Eustream, in an attempt at energy dependence. Agreements were made to use a 20 year old pipeline that had never been used before, providing Ukraine with 3 billion cubic metres of natural gas in the fall of that year, in hopes it could be increased in 2015 to 10 million cubic metres (Laurence, 2014). At the beginning of April Gazprom cancelled the formerly agreed upon gas discount, and again demanded Ukraine was in debt and must repay the full amount. Moscow hiked the price of gas to $485.00 per 1,000 cubic metres, nearly double any standard gas price of the time (Mazneva, 2014). Ukraine paid $786 million to Gazprom at the end of May in hopes of leaving the contract entirely, but Moscow countered stating that Ukraine’s debt was $4.5 billion (Bloomberg, 2014). Over the next year, Ukraine agreed to pay up front for their gas, at an agreed upon $378 per thousand cubic metres (BBC, 2014). Ukraine also agreed to pay a total of $4.6 billion in existing fees. By November of 2015, Ukraine had secured natural gas supply from other suppliers and ceased to purchase from Gazprom altogether (BBC, 2014). Ukraine has been energy independent of Russia ever since.
Georgia

October of 2001 is the first reported instance of Russian coercion of Georgia. It's been 10 years since the fall of the Soviet Union and Georgia’s independence from the USSR. ‘Radio Free Europe’ described the situation in Georgia as heightened tensions between the two countries (Peuche, 2001). There were four Russian bases in Georgia, two of which were scheduled to be closed by July of 2001, but Moscow started to make claims of keeping them all open, on a fifteen year extension. Georgia demanded that Russia remove all troops from Georgian soil but Russia is pressing for them to rescind this demand (Frantz, 2001). Russia used what is now their age old trick of threatening to cut off gas supply in order to manipulate Georgia into doing their bidding.

In May of 2003, the beginning of the Georgian section of an oil pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan to Ceyhan, Turkey was in the works. The ownership of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is a conglomerate of eleven energy companies, headed by BP; most of which are western companies, and none of which are Russian owned (Balat and Ersoy, 2005). Because of the expansion of western oil throughout Georgia via this pipeline, and with Russia’s contention towards western oil, or any company that is not run by Moscow, Russia made efforts to intimidate Georgia’s complicity for the pipeline by shutting off oil supply in the meantime, leaving Georgia with no gas until the new pipeline is completed. Moscow’s second and more prominent reason for shutting off oil in Georgia in 2003 was a blatant scare tactic as Russia claimed Georgia was allowing Chechnya rebels to cross the Georgian border, to seek a hiding place. At the time, Chechnya was a war-torn republic, occupied by Russia, and Moscow would not tolerate the revolutionaries slipping through their grasp. Vladimir Putin, President of Russia went so far as to threaten with military action through air raids and strikes on Georgia because, as he said, “Russia has the right to defend itself from terrorist attacks launched from Georgian
territory”. The terrorist attacks Putin is referring to is solely the fact that Georgia did not root out the refugees and turn them over (Meyers, 2002). Because of Georgia’s so called aid to these refugees, Russia took the opportunity to not only punish Chechnya further, but to expand that punishment to all the peoples of Georgia, by cutting off oil in the middle of winter, only for providing safety to refugees.

Moscow had their hands in every aspect of the Georgian government by 2005, securing hand picked candidates for political offices and heads of the military forces. With Russian positive leadership, Georgia would be left to Moscow’s devices, and culminated in the sabotage of energy installations that were not Russian, as well as a bombing of police headquarters in the town of Gori. As tensions rose, simultaneously, “a series of explosions in southern Russia cut off the flow of natural gas and electricity from Russia into Georgia” (Getting Georgia Right, Cornell). Two explosions occurred on January 21, 2006 in the middle of the night striking through both tubes of the main gas pipeline to Georgia, with another blast hours later on an electricity pylon. “The three blasts left Georgia with limited supplies of Russian gas for heating. It also meant Georgia could only supply about 40% of the electricity demanded by its 3 million inhabitants in temperatures of -5C (23F)” (Walsh, 2006). The explosions were deemed by Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili as "a serious act of sabotage on the part of Russia on Georgia's energy system". He told Reuters: "Basically what happened is totally outrageous and we are dealing with an outrageous blackmail by people who do not want to behave in a civilised way” (Walsh, 2006). There is still speculation to this day if the explosions were an accident, if they were strategically planned by Moscow, or any number of conspiracies surrounding the topic, such as domestic terrorists looking to dismantle Russian-Georgian relations, but one thing is for certain, Georgia went without electricity and gas in the middle of a cold winter, just as so
many others had in the past when being controlled by Russia’s stronghold on the energy market of the region.

**Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania**

In 1990, while the fall of the Soviet Union moved from a distant thought or possibility to an inevitability, independence movements were booming across the surrounding Soviet occupied nations. In response to Gorbachev’s glasnost, or “openness” Lithuania began to reassess their identity. Lithuania becomes the first Soviet Republic to declare its independence, with the ‘Act of the Re-establishment of the State of Lithuania’ on March 11, 1990. As with most multi-dimensional independence movements, one nation-state declaring independence could create a domino effect. In an effort to deter other republics from revolution, the Soviet government enacted an oil embargo and economic blockade upon Lithuania (History.com, ‘This Day in History’). This is a clear last attempt to hold onto the Russian Empire.

Following the effort of deterrence in Lithuania, Russia sent troops to occupy the neighboring Baltic States; Latvia and Estonia. Just a mere two years later, Russia cut off oil exports to Latvia and Estonia in the midst of a freezing winter. The oil cut offs lasted through the winter of 1992 and continued throughout 1993. Moscow claimed the cut was due to a pricing conflict between the Nations and Russia, but it was later discovered that in reality it was to pressure the Baltic States into rescinding their demand that Russian troops be withdrawn from their soil. Moscow had the power to influence policies in former Soviet Republics and they knowingly and willingly took advantage of that (Smith, 2004). This instance of energy manipulation was a clear and direct threat to the people of the Baltic States, as the citizens literally froze due to lack of heat and other resources necessary provided by oil.
The political manipulation did not stop after the early nineties. In fact, Moscow’s reach for power of the former Soviet republics continues to this day. For the Baltic States specifically, this means three more instances of Russian intervention in their oil supply. ‘Peace’, or essentially no dangerous manipulation from Moscow to the States lasted five years until 1998, when the Lithuanian government began the search for a Western strategic investor to reach a crude oil supply negotiation with Russia, and to manage their oil facilities (Smith, 2004). Lithuania found and started negotiations with a Western Company, the Williams Company of the United States, in 1988, when Russia wanted one of its three major oil powers, Lukoil, to remain the sole provider to Lithuania. Russia was in no way ready to give up the economic, political, and arguably humanitarian power it had over the peoples of Lithuania, so in response to the negotiations, Moscow turned off the supply of oil, again. Throughout 1998 and 1999, Moscow turned off the oil supply at least nine times, always claiming it was for “technical reasons”, however it is simple to see through their deception. Turning off the supply of oil to the people of Lithuania prevented the government from finalizing negotiations with the Williams company, as they could hardly stay afloat. The government moved towards negotiations with an oil company from Kazakhstan, which Russia shut down almost immediately. As Russia had control of the Transneft system, the largest oil pipeline system to date, they threatened Kazakhstan with a halt on all of their westward shipments should they negotiate a contract with Lithuania. Lukoil funneled money to political groups in the Baltic States in order to manipulate the winners of elections, for the sole purpose of having their hand dipped into the government of these States and by and large increase positive perception of Moscow. “They are encouraged by the Kremlin to use these profits to advance Moscow’s foreign policy goals. Russian energy company funding
of political groups in the states of the former Soviet Union, has by and large been successful in buying influence for the Kremlin” (Smith, 2004).

Fast forward to 2002, Ventspils, a town located in northwestern Latvia on the Baltic Sea and Venta River, is the prime focus of Russia’s oil plans. Because of Ventspils prime location with direct access to the Baltic Sea, Russia wanted to take full control of the port for themselves. Ventspil was and is still one of the only ice-free ports in the region, making it prime real estate for oil transfers. The reason that Ventspil is one of the only ice-free ports in the region, is because of latitude and longitudinal placement within the Climate Zones. It just barely sits in a temperate zone, lending itself to a maritime climate; wet, with moderate winters (ClimateZone.com). Because of the lack of access to moderate temperature areas for Russia and their exports, this makes Vestpils the prime spot on the Sea. (Ventspils, for your entertainment, holds the national record for highest temperature ever recorded in Latvia, at 37.8 degrees Celsius, or 100 degrees Fahrenheit. This record also holds true for them within all three Baltic States (Burt, 2014)). They withheld crude shipments from going through the port, and instead transferred the oil flow to a pipeline outside of the Latvian border, (Council of European Energy Regulators, 2016) then Transneft slashed oil supplies in a strategy aimed at taking over the terminal (Leyveld, 2002). The implications of this were negative to both sides, as it hurt Russia’s own exports to the port in the short-term, and while Ventspils was priorly a major outlet for Europe, exports came to a near halt. A Transneft official, speaking on behalf of Moscow, was quoted as saying that either, “Ventspils will dry up,” or it “should be controlled by the Russian side”. ‘Ventspils accounted for 45 percent of the Russian petroleum shipped through the Baltic states the year prior, in 2001, and that number tanked, with only two oil cargoes being handled in
a given month by 2002. There was a lot of confusion as to why Russia would implicate itself in this way, restricting their own exports and profit, but it unequivocally reinforces the notion that Russia will do whatever it takes to gain political and economic control over another nation, whether it be by control of a port specifically, or the entire energy supply to a nation, no matter the cost to them (Leyveld, 2002).

The final recorded instance of Russia influencing the Baltic States via weaponized energy was in late July 2006. Russia shut its only pipeline supplying crude oil to Lithuania off, because of what Moscow deemed a ‘leak’. However, as could be determined by Russia’s past in deception referring to energy in attempt to manipulate a country, a leak was not the case. It was not even necessarily the pipeline that concerned Moscow, but what the pipeline was connected to: Lithuania’s sole refinery (Kramer, 2006). Lithuania had just a month prior, in June 2006, signed an agreement to sell the refinery to a Polish company called PKN Orlen, for what the Lithuanian government said was much more than what Russia had offered them. “The goal was to force Lithuania to reconsider the sale,” Tomas Janeliunas, deputy director of the Center for Strategic Studies who has followed the sale closely, said in an interview. “They wanted a Russian company to buy the refinery, but for cheaper than a market price” (Kramer, 2004). It became evident, even in the present of 2006, that Russia would strong arm countries in attempts to gain political and economic power, and with their stronghold of the energy supply in the region, it was the most convenient and dangerous tactic they had. ‘Vice President Dick Cheney once called Moscow’s use of energy exports as “tools of intimidation or blackmail” in relation with its neighbors.’ Because of the prominence of the United States in the oil sector, as well as
the long-standing hostile relations between America and Russia, this of course exasperated Russian officials.

The fact that the global community would listen to the United States as opposed to, say, the smaller former Soviet Republics who had been enduring this intimidation for years, launched Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, into the defense. “What is all the hysteria about?” he asked. “We cannot understand why the media is nervous about Russia’s possible investments” referencing the pipeline to be built to Germany, which would directly affect the Baltic States, in making it possible to bypass them completely to export crude oil to Europe. Lukoil, the same company who interfered years prior in the Baltic States bid on the refinery, along with TNK-BP another Russian company, but ultimately lost as they refused to bid along with market prices. Russia seemed to lose interest, but no one can ever know the true reason Moscow dropped its determination for the Lithuanian refinery. Everything Russia does in regards to energy is strategic, and it is feasible to assume they had other plans brewing (Kramer, 2004).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study identified key questions ranging from whether or not Russia has established use of energy as a weapon, to the search for supporting indicators of this, to a broader why did Russia do this, and how did they achieve it. The 22 instances shown in which Russia used price manipulation and/or price coercion shows there is established use of energy as a weapon by Russia in multiple instances ranging from the fall of the Soviet Union and over the next twenty-five years. The most significant and frequent cases of coercion and manipulation have occurred against Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States. It has been determined that Moscow strategically
attacked former Soviet States in an effort for re-unification, or control. Russia was not successful in making Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States concede to the demands of re-unification. In the most notable instances, Russia cut off the oil and gas supply to States, resulting in no energy for heat and everyday energy needs, leaving citizens of those States to suffer and/or freeze. Russia was successful in consolidating control of energy resources, State control over export routes, price hikes, and supply disruptions. They were, however, not successful in forcing those states to concede to the ultimate demands of Moscow, which would have made those countries dependent politically, economically, and socially.

**TABLE TWO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preconditions</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exporter consolidates control of energy resources</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State control over export routes</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exporter carries out price hikes and/or supply disruptions</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target state acquiesces/concedes to exporter state demands</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target state diversifies energy supply sources after initial coercion attempts</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Question mark indicates that the effectiveness of Russia’s use of the “energy weapon” to achieve its policy objectives was unclear.

**SOURCES:** Karen Smith Stegen’s author’s analysis of Gazprom export volume data
Ukraine now uses reverse flows from neighboring states, so its Russian-origin gas supplies are indirect, making them completely independent of Russian gas. Georgia’s primary energy supply comes from Azerbaijan. While Azerbaijan’s gas supply is dependent on Russia, Georgia is not directly dependent on Russia in that way. This past decade has been the most politically taxing for Georgia since its independence of the USSR in 1991, but they are slowly building their own stable political foundation. The Baltic States have proven to be a tricky situation. Estonia and Latvia remain completely dependent on Russian energy while Lithuania is somewhat independent, about the same as countries like Italy and the Czech Republic. However, rather than changing their strategy state-by-state, as originally hypothesized, it became evident that Russia changed their strategic goals over time, based off of Moscow’s power hungry and politically charged desires of the ‘era’. This conclusion is paramount as it approaches the idea that Moscow was strategic and critical on multiple fronts at the same time, on purpose, and for the same reason, while using the mask of the arbitrary to their advantage. Until these cases were cross referenced within this analysis, it was difficult to make the distinction and connection between each case within the broader perspective. This analysis lends each case to its respective time period, of the four periods outlined, and provides a structure for what had previously been deemed chaos.
TABLE THREE

The Four Era’s of Soviet Oil and Gas Manipulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>Russia’s last attempts at saving the Soviet Union.</td>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2006</td>
<td>Russia’s attempt at interference in Western crude supply agreements. Caused short term hysteria, that did not last.</td>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2013</td>
<td>Russia blatantly lies about reasons for energy supply shut-offs, refuses to agree on prices, and pressures countries to turn back on their already made agreements with other countries.</td>
<td>Unsuccessful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-2015</td>
<td>Sole reason for energy manipulation is to coerce Ukraine into handing over the Crimean Peninsula. Crimea is now administered as two Russian federal subjects, The Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key European Countries Dependence on Russian Gas

NOTE: "Dependence" is determined by percentage of direct Russian imports divided by total annual gas demand. Ukraine now uses reverse flows from neighboring states, so its Russian-origin gas supplies are "indirect."

SOURCES: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2017; GADM (countries); Gazprom (pipeline routes and gas import data)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependence Measure of European Dependence on Russian Gas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Finland, and Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heavily Dependent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, Serbia, Slovakia, and Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderately Dependent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland, Germany, Hungary, and Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Somewhat Dependent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania, Turkey, Denmark, and Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Somewhat Independent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy and Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderately Independent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia, France and United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heavily Independent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania, Croatia, Belgium, and the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Albania, and Cyprus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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