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Abstract

International Sport Federations (IFs), as part of the Olympic network, have different organisational structures and decision-making mechanisms from the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The authors, in examining the history of the International Amateur Athletics Federations' (IAAF) handling of the “China question” in international sport, probe how these differences translated into the IAAF’s organisational politics and power dynamics in face of governmental interference. Primarily examining archival documents obtained from the IAAF Archive and the IOC Historical Archives, the authors particularly follow how the self-governing IAAF upheld, bent, and modified its statutes during its engagement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from the 1950s to the 1970s and around its eventual admission of the PRC’s Athletics Association in 1978. It is also argued that the IAAF’s engagement and inclusion of the PRC allowed the consolidation of its monopolising power in global athletics governance.

Keywords: IAAF, China question, Sport governance, Asian Athletics

Something's Gotta Give: Bent Rules, Breached Bottom Line, and the International Amateur Athletics Federations' Handling of the "China Question"

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The International Olympic Committee's (IOC) handling of the "China question" has been discussed extensively in sport history literature.¹ In 1949, the Nationalist government, defeated in the Chinese Civil War, fled to Taiwan, where it continued the Republic of China (ROC) regime. Also in exile were the Chinese Olympic Committee and most of the ROC's national sport federations.² Meanwhile in the mainland, the Communist Party founded the People's Republic of China (PRC). Its All-China Athletic Federation (ACAF), established as a supposedly non-governmental National Olympic Committee (NOC), in fact operated under the State Sport Commission.³ As a front of the PRC's battle for global recognition as the sole legitimate Chinese government, the ACAF began to challenge the ROC's seat in the Olympic Movement in 1952. It was not until 1979 that a solution for both to coexist in international sport was concocted and accepted by all parties.⁴ As such, the "China question" constitutes a prime example of the inherently political nature of sport that sport governing bodies so often deny.

The Lausanne-based IOC, albeit at the centre of world sport governance, did not solve the conundrum alone, but relied on a network of sport organisations, governments, corporations, and individuals.⁵ Among them, International Federations (IFs)—non-governmental organisations that national sport federations (NFs) form to jointly govern and represent a sport worldwide⁶—played a vital role. Holding the ultimate authority in the global governance of its sport, an IF devises statutes and policies through its congress or assembly, where NFs discuss and vote on matters, though the president and the executive board (or equivalent) often wield an outsized sway.⁷ IFs must abide by the *Olympic Charter*, but many issues, such as membership, fall out of the IOC's

jurisdiction. Lausanne's general coordination notwithstanding, each IF had to individually handle the "China question" of its own sport and engage Beijing- and Taipei-based NFs.

IFs' endeavours in solving the "China question" were significant in three ways. First, procedurally, the IOC's recognition of an NOC required five IF-affiliated NFs,⁸ enabling the IOC's and IFs' different decision-making mechanisms to create complications. Unlike the IOC, where individual members cast votes, the NF-based voting system inside IFs allowed the Chinese governments and their allies greater access to interfere with the decision-making process through NFs. Second, IF officials, as part of the Olympic transnational network, were essential in lobbying their Chinese interlocutors to make decisions that could favour the international sport establishment.⁹ Third, each IF's discretion concerning membership and eligibility allowed the exploration of potential solutions, arguably on Lausanne's behalf. The IFs of skiing, table tennis, and tennis mostly avoided extreme political tension because their sports' Chinese NFs stayed in the mainland in 1949. Some, such as the International Rowing Federation (FISA) and the International Fencing Federation (FIE), had not previously recognised a Chinese member and swiftly accepted the PRC's application in 1974.¹⁰ However, most IFs had to reconsider the status of a recognised ROC member while engaging the PRC, including those overseeing the more prominent Olympic sports; namely, the International Amateur Athletics Federation (IAAF)¹¹, the International Swimming Federation (FINA), and the International Football Federation (FIFA), whose greenlight was essential for a universal resolution.

The trio were among the last holdouts to admit the PRC's NFs as they sought to retain Taiwan's representation in some form and thus appeared more rigid,¹² or per the Chinese, "conservative" and "in the hands of the Anglo-Saxon bloc."¹³ In late 1978, however, the IAAF pulled ahead among "major" IFs and admitted the PRC Athletic Federation (PRCAA) at the

expense of its rival in Taipei. This decision, rather than a sudden change of position, was the culmination of a series of IAAF manoeuvres spanning nearly three decades and co-influenced by its shifting internal dynamics, the two Chinas' diplomatic battle, and Cold War politics.

Unfortunately, existing literature that examines the history of the “China question” in global sport, including scholarly works and key individuals' memoirs,¹⁴ almost entirely focuses on events immediately related to the IOC from the perspective of the PRC or the ROC and includes only fragmented account of interactions with IFs. As an exception, historian Heidrun Homburg, in studying the FIFA's management of the “China question,” argues that it turned its statutes, through evolving interpretation of the texts, into “highly sophisticated tools ... for pursuing ... political objectives.”¹⁵ This strategy, albeit expected to also apply to the IAAF, does not explain the major discrepancy: the IAAF officially recognised the PRC earlier than the IOC, while the FIFA followed Lausanne's step.

In examining and analysing documents obtained from the IAAF Archive and the IOC Historical Archives and corroborating and complementing them with key officials' memoirs, we shed light on the IAAF's organisational behaviour and decision-making amidst shifting international and internal politics and delineate its power and limitations as part of global sport governance. Rather than relitigating the “China question,” we aim to enrich existing research with IAAF-specific history and, more importantly, presents a nuanced picture where the IAAF keenly pursued the PRC—often to the extent of bending and even changing rules to specifically engage and eventually admit the PRCAA—and grew increasingly reluctant to retain the ROC. It is argued that the IAAF, albeit boasting its institutionalist rule of athletics, comfortably justified unilateral rule bending or change when it favoured the organisation's global expansion, aligned with the trend in Cold War politics, and reflected its leaders' personal politics and will,

especially as demonstrated in the events leading up to its 1978 breakthrough in solving the “China question.”

Before 1958: Unrequited Pro-Beijing Position

The “China question” surfaced at a time when international sport governance encountered a vastly different post-World War II world order featuring the Cold War and the global trend of decolonisation. Countries such as China, Germany and Korea were divided, with rivalling regimes supported by either the United States or the Soviet Union. For sport governing bodies, admitting new members now entailed balancing the opposing interests of political powers.¹⁶

IAAF President, British aristocrat David Burghley (also known as Lord Exeter), a former Olympic hurdler and staunch advocate of amateurism, seemed to possess the savviness to steer his organisation through this highly politicised environment. After all, in 1948, he spearheaded the IAAF’s admission of the Soviet Union against opposition from other sport leaders, including IOC President Avery Brundage, over the Soviet government’s *de facto* control over its sport organisations.¹⁷

The conundrum with the two Chinas would prove much more complicated. The IAAF had recognised the Chinese National Amateur Athletics Federation (CNAAF) under the Nationalist government since 1928. After relocating to Taipei, the CNAAF smoothly registered its address change, its name unquestioned, thanks to the IAAF leadership’s lack of attention to the geopolitical developments in Asia and the wide support for the ROC in the west. In 1952, the PRC, at the persuasion of its ally, the Soviet Union, launched offensives for the ROC’s seats in international sport and demanded an exclusive invitation to the Helsinki Olympic Games in the summer. Shortly before those Games opened, the IOC decided to provisionally allow both Chinas to participate and have IFs determine their eligibility in each sport.¹⁸ Within the IAAF,

Burghley, despite having acknowledged his preference for Beijing in private,¹⁹ chose to let the matter run its course in the Congress, where member NFs, under the spell of Cold War-induced division, reached a cul-de-sac: those from the Eastern Bloc supported only recognising the PRC, whereas others largely endorsed admitting both.²⁰ They voted to defer the matter to the 1954 Congress,²¹ but this inaction had limited impact: the ROC had boycotted those Games, and the PRC arrived too late to participate in most sports.²²

After the Helsinki Games, Burghley started to direct the IAAF Secretariat to intervene behind the scenes. In 1953, Donald Pain, the IAAF's Honorary Secretary-Treasurer, wrote to ACAF General Secretary Rong Gaotang and inquired about China's position on seeking membership.²³ Rong confirmed indirectly, stating that Chinese athletes were preparing for the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games,²⁴ which would require the IAAF's recognition of a Chinese NF. In the summer of 1954, the two met in Moscow and discussed the subject more directly just before the Congress,²⁵ where the PRC made gains: the NFs voted to recognise Beijing's representation as "China" and to request the CNAAF to reapply for affiliation as "Formosa," Taiwan's colonial name.²⁶

The indignant CNAAF decried its demotion, but a more outstanding problem for the IAAF was that the newly recognised Chinese NF plainly did not exist. So far, the IAAF had been communicating with the ACAF's "athletic section." Thus, the Congress's decision in 1954 was in fact made against the organisation's membership rule (Rule 7),²⁷ and the leadership had to retrospectively perform due diligence to obtain required documents from Beijing. For several months, Pain urged Rong for the Beijing-based NF's application form, statutes, and membership due, but Chinese officials dodged these requests.²⁸ Besides its unfamiliarity with and disregard for the established structure of international sport governance, the PRC also held the position that

governing bodies should transfer China's sole seat, occupied by the ROC, to it instead of soliciting a new application. What the IAAF saw as a procedural formality was, to the PRC, an infringement on its sovereignty. A fallout would arise out of this disparity in 1958, but for the time being, an urgent telegram of January 1955 helped persuade the Chinese: the annual handbook would soon be in print, and a recognised federation must pay its due to be included in the member list.²⁹ Finally, the long sought-after application form and constitution of the Athletic Association of the People's Republic of China (PRCAA), newly reorganised from the ACSF's athletics section, arrived in early February.³⁰

The recent developments likely led the Chinese to believe that they had the momentum to drive the ROC out of the picture. However, having bent one rule to include the PRC, the IAAF leadership did not desire to breach its bottom line to exclude the ROC. Only upon receiving their first copy of IAAF Congress minutes did the PRCAA learn of the invitation for CNAAF to reapply for membership, pending name change.³¹ PRCAA President Ma Yo-han and Secretary General Yu Yuyun immediately demanded that said invitation be rescinded, decrying the IAAF's violation of its own "one NF for each country" rule (Rule 1) and denouncing its following the "U.S. scheme of creating 'two Chinas'" in world athletics.³²

The accusation of the Chinese was not ungrounded. The IAAF leadership's enforcement of Rule 1 was selectively flexible. Like most sport organisations, it sometimes considered self-governing territories and geographical areas "countries" to accommodate the complexity of world politics.³³ For example, the IAAF recognised the NF of Puerto Rico (U.S. territory) in 1948 and that of Hong Kong (a British colony before 1997) in 1952. Considering the reality that mainland China and Taiwan were separate territories each in "complete control of [their own] young people,"³⁴ the IAAF leadership applied the same exception to the "China question."

Indeed, had the CNAAF been expelled, Taiwanese youths would have likely been excluded from world athletics for decades,³⁵ as the PRCAA under the Communist government simply could not govern athletics affairs in Taiwan. However, East Germany's application for recognition was concurrently blocked in the name of Rule 1,³⁶ and North Korea's, too, in 1958.³⁷ Attempting to justify this inconsistency, Burghley, who tended to pay little attention to political development beyond Europe,³⁸ falsely argued that the PRC's application was "in a very different category" from that of East Germany.³⁹

Even then, the PRC still considered the erasure of Nationalist China's representation from international sport attainable, and the PRCAA, amidst its vehement protests, otherwise interacted with the IAAF leadership courteously.⁴⁰ Talks about Chinese athletes' entry to the athletic events of the 1956 Melbourne Games also continued.⁴¹ To Beijing's great dismay, the IAAF remained committed to retaining Taiwan. From 1954 to 1956, Pain repeatedly solicited a new application from the Nationalist Chinese, who, albeit disgruntled and reluctant, accepted to be just "Taiwan" on the eve of the Melbourne Games.⁴² The 1956 Congress then swiftly readmitted the CNAAF as "Taiwan" over the PRCAA delegates' vehement opposition and the dissent from the Soviet Union, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. Notably, Hungary and Yugoslavia, supposedly the PRC's Socialist allies, joined the majority.⁴³ At this time, the IOC and many IFs recognised both two Chinas as a balance act while seeking global expansion and navigating the conflicting political interests of the Eastern and Western Blocs, but the IAAF stood out by calling the ROC "Taiwan," which likely resulted from Burghley's reconciling his pro-PRC position and institutionalist beliefs.

While the ROC succumbed to the IAAF's pressure, the PRC refused to accept this arrangement. Beijing boycotted the Melbourne Games and withdrew from the IOC and IFs that

recognised both Chinese NFs in August 1958. Chinese sport official Dong Shouyi, a long-time acquaintance of Burghley's, also renounced his IOC membership then.⁴⁴ Elevating a non-governmental organisation's recognition to a matter of sovereignty and territorial integrity, PRC officials declared in the PRCAA's withdrawal statement that the IAAF, "under the manipulation of some people with ulterior motives," abetted the "U.S. scheme of creating 'two Chinas'."⁴⁵ However, Beijing's ire did not truly reflect the IAAF's position and objective. On the contrary, the IAAF had been consistently pro-Beijing: its recognition of the PRC in 1954 was unanimous, and even some of Beijing's socialist allies supported the reaffiliation of Taiwan. This also rendered the PRC's blame on the IAAF's weighted voting system ungrounded.⁴⁶ In place until the late 1980s, said system allotted greater voting power to wealthy and powerful countries' NFs and deservedly received criticism from both within and outside the organisation,⁴⁷ but it hardly disadvantaged the PRC.

The PRC did not self-ostracise because the IOC and IFs actively acted against it, but because of the incompatibility of their purposes: the PRC's goal to eliminate Nationalist representation required the exclusion of the athletes from Taiwan, whom these organisations had a fundamental obligation to include and accommodate.⁴⁸ Admitting and retaining the PRCAA might be worth bending rules for, but excluding Taiwan was simply out of the question.⁴⁹ Still, the PRCAA's exit was undesirable for the IAAF and many affiliated members. In support of China, NFs from Eastern Bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union, continued to protest the reaffiliation of Taiwan.⁵⁰ Now that the IAAF Congress and Secretariat had led the matter towards a cul-de-sac, Burghley personally intervened, hoping to salvage the relations between his organisation and the PRC. After all, the Chinese, when announcing their withdrawal,

acknowledged that “quite a number of gentlemen in the IAAF [were] just-minded”⁵¹—maybe the Briton was one of them?

Futile Post-1958 Tactics: Abeyance and Semantic Games

Hoping to retain the PRCAA, the IAAF leadership exhausted all efforts through official and personal channels. This was consistent with Burghley’s universalist mission in promoting athletics globally, which led him to pursue the inclusion of the Soviet Union in the 1940s and newly independent nations as decolonisation process broadened during the Cold War. The first tactic was abeyance: in response to the PRCAA’s statement, Pain claimed that Beijing’s position could not be presented to IAAF members as the 1958 Congress had just closed. He went on to defend his organisation, arguing that, instead of “creating two Chinas,” it was simply working with the reality of the separation of mainland China and Taiwan, as it did with Germany and Korea. Moreover, he would defer the circulation of this withdrawal letter to allow the Chinese time to reconsider.⁵²

Meanwhile, Burghley’s *personal* communication with Chinese officials increased significantly. Even though he admitted in February 1959 that “As the I.A.A.F. is a voluntary body, all members are entitled to resign at will,”⁵³ the IAAF president did not relent but employed a second tactic: semantics.⁵⁴ Writing to Dong Shouyi to request an open private channel, Burghley floated a far-fetched “misinterpretation” of a quote from Dong’s previous letter,

I gathered ... that your organisation wished to resign immediately, but quoting from your letter that “unless the I.A.A.F. rectify its mistake, the [PRCAA] will have to sever all relations with the I.A.A.F.” gives me reason to think that perhaps in the process of

translation of the first letter this action was not intended for that particular moment, but is what [the PRCAA] may feel in the future that it will have to do.⁵⁵

Only that the Briton reckoned the IAAF had no mistake to “rectify.” At a May 1959 Council meeting, the Soviet Union continued to advocate for China through Council member Leonid Khomenkov, who revived the PRCAA’s claim for jurisdiction over the athletics affairs in all of China, including Taiwan. Burghley, in full command of his organisation and mindful of its universalist mission, dismissed this argument as of “no useful purpose.”⁵⁶ Rather, having presented the correspondence between the IAAF and the PRCAA since August 1958 along with his connotations, the Briton secured the Council members’ agreement on deferring the matter to the 1960 Congress, where the Chinese could present its case, should his “misinterpretation” be by any chance correct.⁵⁷

Pain relayed the message to the PRCAA, while noting that its withdrawal, if finalised, would render Chinese athletes ineligible for international events.⁵⁸ After all, the IAAF was a membership-based club that operated on exclusivity, and the “rules relating to eligibility of athletes to compete under IAAF rules”⁵⁹ (later Rule 12) of its constitution forbade members to compete with non-members. The Chinese likely did not respond, and by the time the IAAF Congress convened in the fall of 1960, “it was not quite clear as to whether they were resigning or whether they might feel compelled to do so.”⁶⁰ Therefore, member NFs did not reach a concrete resolution but passed an “attitude” that “every effort be made to bring into our sport all the young people of the world,” and Khomenkov was tasked with conveying it to the PRCAA.⁶¹

Burghley also personally delivered the Congress’s decision to Dong, along with another piece of “good” news: the concurrent IOC Session, as a result of its institutionalist leadership’s efforts to sustain Taiwan’s participation against the Socialist countries’ opposition to the ROC’s

presence, decided to require the Nationalist Chinese to compete as “Taiwan,” effective immediately at the 1960 Olympic Games.⁶² The Briton argued that international sport organisations hereby demonstrated that they only recognised “one China and that [was] Peking.”⁶³ As IOC Vice President, Burghley had endorsed this measure himself—the IAAF adopted it in 1956—hoping to help China’s Olympic reaffiliation “as far as [he could].”⁶⁴ However, in his reply, Dong was far from “pleased” about, but held the “strongest opposition,” to this dual recognition of China and Taiwan, what the Chinese had characterised as “in itself a ‘two Chinas’ conspiracy” “under the manipulation of Brundage,” who was “in close collaboration with the U.S. government.”⁶⁵ At the end, Dong twisted the knife: he “would like to remind [Burghley] that the [PRCAA] had already withdrawn from the [IAAF] in 1958.”⁶⁶

Interestingly, in August 1961, IAAF Council member Adriaan Paulen, after witnessing Chinese athletes compete in the Soviet Union and Poland, speculated that China, along with East European countries, still considered itself affiliated. He requested the leadership to inquire whether this “erased the slight difference of opinion that had arisen in the past.”⁶⁷ As if having not received enough rejection, Paulen wrote to confirm the changed position and request owed membership dues, only to hear back that the Chinese were “surprised at finding that the [IAAF] had not ... had a correct understanding of the fact ...”⁶⁸ In fact, the Chinese simply disregarded the eligibility rules, and the delay in the finalisation of the PRCAA’s withdrawal, in addition to the IAAF leadership’s goodwill, allowed China to continue to compete with members without paying dues all the while of publicly denouncing the IAAF.

Now that the Chinese had twice confirmed its detachment, Burghley finally wrote to Yu at the end of 1961 that Chinese athletes were henceforth ineligible to compete with those representing over one hundred IAAF members.⁶⁹ This ban was circulated among member NFs in

January 1962.⁷⁰ Even then, the PRC's Socialist allies, especially the Soviet Union, feigned confusion and openly defied the policy: Chinese athletes, including star high jumper Zheng Fengrong, competed in the Brothers Znamensky Prize in late June in Moscow.⁷¹ When Pain wrote to Khomenkov for an explanation, the Russian claimed that the organisers invited the Chinese before the ban was issued, and that Burghley himself acquiesced when they discussed the matter prior to the meet.⁷²

Considering all his futile efforts, having to enforce a ban of the PRC's athletes must have felt like a personal defeat to Burghley. Throughout his tenure, the IAAF President successfully bridged the Eastern and Western blocs in the cases of the Soviet Union and the two Germanies, but he failed to persuade his friendly yet intransigent interlocutors in Beijing. The following decade only witnessed the relations between the IAAF and the PRC further deteriorate. In the fall of 1962, China and Arab countries persuaded Indonesia to exclude ROC and Israeli athletes from the Asian Games in Jakarta. When the IOC and IFs sanctioned Indonesian sport bodies, Indonesia, China, North Korea, and North Vietnam co-founded the Games of New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) movement, seeking to disrupt the status quo of Asian and global sport governance, with Beijing as the top patron.⁷³ The GANEFO only achieved limited success, and China's descent into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 both ended this movement and extracted all Chinese athletes from international sport for nearly five years.⁷⁴

Resumed Liaisons in the early 1970s: The Gift of Rule Changes

Taking advantage of Chinese sportspersons' near-complete absence from the global stage in the late 1960s, Taipei-based NOC and NFs, now the only Chinese representatives, managed to change their names from "Taiwan" to "Republic of China" in 1968.⁷⁵ However, before long, as part of its strategic shift, Chinese state leadership aimed to renegotiate the country's status in

world politics through augmented cultural exchanges, including sport diplomacy, in 1970. Best known for the Sino-U.S. ping pong diplomacy,⁷⁶ these intergovernmental programmes brought Chinese national teams in multiple sports to nearly all regions around the globe by 1973.⁷⁷ Diplomatic breakthroughs burgeoned concurrently, with newly established diplomatic relations with about forty countries between 1970 and 1973 and, most notably, the PRC's replacing the ROC for China's sole seat inside the United Nations (UN).⁷⁸ This change in world politics, albeit imposing no immediate mandate on sport organisations, did create a sense of urgency for them to build paths for the world's most populated country's return.

Among the PRC's new "official friends" were Iran and Japan, who were now helping Beijing regain its footing in international sport governance. In fact, China had long established close ties with Japanese sport field, and the Shah of Iran, undoubtedly out of geopolitical considerations, now vowed to facilitate the PRC athletes' Asian Games debut in Tehran in 1974. In 1972, the campaign to rehabilitate the PRC in Asian sport was launched, with two primary goals: (a) replacing the ROC Olympic Committee (ROCO) with the ACSF as China's sole representative in the Asian Games Federation (AGF), and (b) securing the IOC's patronage and permits from IFs to maintain the Tehran Games' status as continental games *given* China's participation. The former materialised relatively swiftly in the fall of 1973,⁷⁹ while the latter proved a more complicated undertaking.

For the IAAF, the two objectives above translated into separate matters: (a) the exclusion of the ROC Track and Field Association (ROCTFA), a member in good standing, from the Asian Games, and (b) the violation of Rule 12 if China, a non-member, participated. The IAAF leadership had long favoured Beijing over Taipei, but the ROCTFA's legitimate membership rendered it unrealistic for the IAAF to handle either through strictly adhering to its rules and

principles—not that it was going to. In March 1973, ROCTFA President Wang Tih-wu wrote to Burghley and sought the Briton’s support at the upcoming General Assembly of International Federations (GAIF) meeting.⁸⁰ Burghley refused, for the IAAF was not a GAIF member,⁸¹ and further warned that the PRCAA’s potential reaffiliation would trigger the reconsideration of the ROCTFA’s name⁸²—a position officially introduced in a May 1974 statement of the IAAF that urged the PRCAA to apply for membership.⁸³ The coldness would continue in 1974: in addition to declining invitations to visit Taiwan,⁸⁴ the IAAF leadership even refused to merely send a message for print in the official publication of the ROC’s 1974 National Championships.⁸⁵

Meanwhile, the PRC advanced its agenda. Since they re-established contact with international sport organisations in late 1972, the Chinese, while condemning any form of recognition of the ROC regime, including that of its sport organisations, endeavoured to build closer ties with sport governing bodies by developing “personal” channels, arranging “informal” visits, and handing out gifts. With the more pragmatic Irishman, Lord Killanin, taking over Brundage’s presidency in late 1972, the IOC professed its commanding power and helped smooth over another reservation commonly helped by IFs: after the AGF replaced the ROCOC with the ACSF in November 1973, major IFs, including the IAAF, felt obligated to protest the exclusion of their members in good standing. Despite his pro-Beijing stance and a general apathy for Taiwan, Burghley, an institutionalist after all, suggested to Killanin that Lausanne rescind its patronage to the Asian Games for violating Olympic rules.⁸⁶ However, in February, the IOC Executive Board (EB), from which Burghley resigned in 1970, heeded Iranian sport officials’ plea, maintained its patronage to the AGF (while “deplor[ing]” the exclusion of the ROCOC), and referred the eligibility issue to individual IFs.⁸⁷ This decision emboldened IFs to acquiesce to the PRC’s advance in Asia. The IAAF soon issued a permit for the Tehran Games’ athletics

events, though it was in Category C (Group Games and Championships) instead of Category B (Regional Games).⁸⁸ The downgraded permit was an obligatory gesture, but the Games could go on—that is, if the PRCAA could timely rejoin the IAAF to avoid Rule 12 violation.

The simplest solution would be for the PRCAA to seek reaffiliation, but Beijing demanded the expulsion of the ROC first, whereas the IAAF drew the line at the ROCTFA's membership, which could only be annulled for rule violation. In fact, the IAAF leadership stressed at multiple meetings with the Chinese that the PRCAA's readmission would not come at the expense of Taiwanese athletes.⁸⁹ As if to demonstrate its resolution to uphold Rule 12—and definitely in order to jostle China into applying—the IAAF Council suspended some Pakistani athletes for three months in May 1974 for competing with Chinese athletes at the Pakistan National Games, inviting harsh criticism from the PRCAA.⁹⁰ Pain's successor, Frederick Holder, later explained that these Pakistani athletes had already received a warning for Rule 12 violation and, as if to deflect responsibility, urged the PRC to acquire membership and avoid placing friendly countries in such dilemma.⁹¹ To further enrage Beijing, Council members also decided to establish a subcommittee, led by Holder, on the "China question,"⁹² to which the PRCAA responded that the IAAF "absolutely ha[d] no right to 'examine'" its "internal affairs."⁹³ Two months before the Tehran Games, a Chinese official simply accepted that Chinese athletes could not compete in the athletics events in Tehran without reaffiliation or rule change.⁹⁴

Soon, however, the very subcommittee recommended unanimously to legalise competition between members and non-members under certain technical conditions and Council approval.⁹⁵ The Council accepted this recommendation: besides its increasingly close relations with Beijing, it simply did not wish to repeatedly discuss sanctions against NFs after they found themselves involved, reluctantly or not, in their governments' exchange programs with China.⁹⁶

At the Congress in August, East Germany motioned this recommended amendment to Rule 12, which, if passed, would enable Chinese track and field athletes' appearance in Tehran. Burghley and the Council expectedly endorsed said proposal but proposed to exclude the Olympic Games, World Championships, and regional games from applicable events.⁹⁷ It would not affect China's prospects at the Tehran Games, though, since the IAAF had issued a lower-level permit. The ensuing debate further illustrated that this rule change was tailored to benefit the PRC: Papa Gallo Thiam from Senegal suggested that the new rule exclude former members but retracted his unintentionally anti-PRC proposal after Paulen responded that the PRCAA actually withdrew voluntarily in 1958.⁹⁸ The Congress then passed the East German proposal with certain amendments and, through this customised change if not abolition of Rule 12, cleared the way for Chinese athletes' Asian Games debut merely one month before the Tehran Games.

Less than a year ago, Burghley stated at a Council meeting that his organisation should not "beg [China's] federation to join,"⁹⁹ yet the measure that the Congress adopted in 1974 was all the IAAF's doing and required *no* substantial compromise from Beijing.¹⁰⁰ The IAAF might continue the recognition of the ROCTFA, but it favoured the PRC on nearly all other matters. The impact of the change to Rule 12 lasted beyond the Tehran Games: China could now participate in international athletic events except the Olympic Games and World Championships without compromising its position on Taiwan. Requests for Council approval to compete with China would pour in from NFs around the globe, so much so that Burghley suggested in 1975 that the Council should just authorise Holder to handle them.¹⁰¹ For the IAAF itself, what appeared as an embarrassment to some extent signified the transformation of the basis of its power from membership to rules. The possibility of a Beijing-led, GANEFO-like initiative to undermine the IAAF's authority had always existed (many NFs had risked suspension to

compete with the PRCAA); now that the world's most populated country could compete as a non-member if IAAF rules were observed, the IAAF's monopoly in athletics governance with *its* statutes, *its* model, and *its* ideals was truly global.

The Exclusion of the ROCTFA: Breached Bottom Line or an Own Goal?

Expecting the PRC to start hosting IAAF-sanctioned competitions, IAAF Executive Director John Holt mailed copies of most recent IAAF Handbooks to Song Zhong, General Secretary of the ACSF, in March 1975.¹⁰² Indeed, a meet between China and Japan was scheduled to take place in Beijing later that year.¹⁰³ However, the unsettled status of the PRCAA remained a subtle issue, and more so when some Council members started to complain about the Chinese's access to "all I.A.A.F. facilities without any obligations," warned of the dissolution of the IAAF, and suggested a time limit for the exception so as to compel the PRCAA to apply for affiliation.¹⁰⁴

The IAAF leadership, however, was closely following the IOC Congress in May, where the Chinese Olympic Committee (reorganised from the ACSF) seemingly had a chance in its official campaign for IOC recognition.¹⁰⁵ Had China succeed there, the IAAF could have simply followed the IOC precedent. Yet Beijing's attempt fell short,¹⁰⁶ and a resurgence in radicalism in Chinese politics reinstated the extreme austerity of the late 1960s, effectively suspending the country's correspondence with the IAAF until the Cultural Revolution ended in late 1976. Interestingly, governmental exchanges did not suffer, and requests from NFs for Council approval to compete with China did not relent, which only bolstered the belief inside the IAAF Council that this special treatment was over-stretched.¹⁰⁷

The silver lining, if any, was that the IFs could take a break from fretting over the ROCTFA's status. In 1975, Holder visited Taiwan for the first time.¹⁰⁸ In 1976, when the Canadian government, at the urge of the PRC, blocked the ROCOC delegation from entering the

country to participate in the Montreal Olympic Games, the IAAF staunchly supported the IOC in defending their members in good standing.¹⁰⁹ However, it was not a moment for Taipei to savour: The Canadian government and the IOC reached a last-minute agreement to allow the ROCOC to compete as “Taiwan” without the ROC’s flag and anthem, but Taipei objected and withdrew in protest.¹¹⁰ This escalation of events presented an opportunity to question the ROCOC and affiliated NFs’ “good standing”: the ROC government could well claim jurisdiction over mainland China, but its sport organisations definitely did not oversee sport governance there, rendering the “China” in their names *potentially* inappropriate. Moreover, if the ROCTFA simply withdrew in protest of a mandated name change, an expulsion might not be necessary after all.

Following Burghley’s resignation in 1976, Adriaan Paulen, a more open-minded and pragmatic thinker from the Netherlands, took over the presidency. The “China question” became a central political issue during the Dutchman’s five-year stint. Later in 1976, Chi Cheng, one of the most successful Chinese/Taiwanese athletes, was offered the ROCTFA Secretary General position. Chi inquired with Paulen whether the IAAF would soon ask the ROCTFA to change its name, expressing her concerns about the imminent expulsion of her organisation and “thus becom[ing] known [*sic*] as a ‘losing secretary’.”¹¹¹ Paulen candidly confirmed but disclosed that there was no application from the PRCAA yet.¹¹²

Beijing’s dormancy would soon end. Fresh out of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC sought to “rectify” its recurrent isolationist attitude and pursued membership with full force. In September 1977, Paulen visited China upon invitation, where he observed “wide-spread athletics activity” and a “very fine match against Japan.”¹¹³ Acknowledging that China had “many outstanding athletes who [were] well disciplined [*sic*] and ha[d] obviously great potential,”

Paulen hoped to maintain the re-established friendly contact and work towards the PRCAA's reaffiliation.¹¹⁴ However, China adamantly kept its precondition. In a January 1978 telegram, Song Zhong, while complimenting Paulen's "sincere and realistic attitude," insisted that the two parties should "cooperate closely ... and work for the expulsion of the Chiang clique and restore [Beijing's] legitimate seat."¹¹⁵

Paulen certainly did not care for Taipei. In October 1977, Chi, upon learning Paulen's China visit, reminded him of an open invitation to visit Taiwan since 1975. To charm the IAAF president, she even called him "Uncle Paulen" because it was "the proper manner and courtesy in China to address someone's elder" and because Paulen was "someone very special" to her.¹¹⁶ Paulen rejected this invitation four months later, and another in August 1978, both through Holt.¹¹⁷ However, in public, Paulen still set the ROCTFA's recognition as an unbreachable bottom line, minding the political consequences of any sign of a blatant move from arguably the most prominent IF. At a 1977 quadripartite meeting between the IOC, the FIFA, the FINA, and the IAAF, the Dutchman even vowed to resign should the IAAF Council expel Taiwan.¹¹⁸

The Dutchman also shielded the IAAF's centrality from the erosion of regional affiliates' disruptive moves. China and its allies schemed to oust the ROCTFA and admit the PRCAA—attending NFs were expected to pass a motion of the Japanese Athletics Association—at the Asian Amateur Athletics Association (AAAA) Congress to be held in Seoul, South Korea, in February 1978.¹¹⁹ The "China question" had generated extreme difficulty for the AAAA in organising the Asian Championships: the ROCTFA must be invited as a member, but many Asian governments prohibited their athletes from competing with their ROC counterparts (Israel was another issue).¹²⁰ Fearing that the South Korea Athletics Federation, Chair Federation of the AAAA and an ROCTFA ally, might "create difficulties," Chinese officials requested Paulen,

who was in attendance, to “use [his] personal influence to facilitate the adoption of the Japanese proposition,”¹²¹ but the Dutchman obstructed first, warning delegates that only the IAAF Congress could expel the ROCTFA, and only for rule violation.¹²² Japan consequently shelved its motion, which Pakistani delegates put forward in absentia only to be ruled out of order.¹²³ Eventually, the AAAA Congress only decided to allow organising the Asian Championships without inviting Taiwan or Israel, leaving the “China question” for the IAAF Congress in October.¹²⁴

Paulen had likely readied his own plan by then. He aimed to “clarify” the IAAF’s rules to require a member’s name to reflect its territory and ascertain the ROCTFA’s rule violation.¹²⁵ At an April meeting, Paulen requested the Council to discuss the constitutionality of the admission of “Taiwan” in 1956 and the legality of reintroducing the name.¹²⁶ As anticipated, the Council recommended to the Congress that the ROCTFA be renamed “Taiwan.”¹²⁷ “It was confusing and unrealistic to continue ... the name of the Republic of China, as you govern athletics in a territory which is such a small proportion of what was originally the whole of China,” Holt wrote to Wang, reassuring him that “this [was] in no way a punitive measure.”¹²⁸ However, there would soon be ground for one: as the Montreal Games episode and ensuing correspondence indicated, the ROCTFA raised its objection in July.¹²⁹

The Council also decided in April to “contact and warmly invite” the PRCAA to reapply for membership.¹³⁰ Probably sensing an imminent breakthrough, the Chinese accepted the necessity of its application and abided in late July.¹³¹ In its application, the PRCAA toned down its usual demand for the ROC’s expulsion but simply requested the IAAF’s recognition as the sole legitimate NF for all of China.¹³² So the Council did in its October meeting: between two proposals, namely, (a) admitting the PRCAA as China’s sole representative and (b) recognising

both the PRCAA and the ROCTFA, the former received one more vote (ten to nine).¹³³ Notably, the Council resolution cited three reasons, including the IAAF's Rule 4 on political boundaries, the UN's 1971 resolution regarding China and Taiwan, and Beijing's unrealistic guarantee to include Taipei in athletics development.¹³⁴

A lengthy debate ensued at the concurrent Congress, where various oppositions were raised. Addressing the role of politics, Paulen responded that the organisation must face the political reality that “a country of nine hundred million was not in membership.”¹³⁵ When a delegate suggested waiting for the IOC's decision, the Dutchman called it “dangerous” to defer any question to Lausanne and explained that Lord Killanin actually hoped IFs to do the test run for the IOC.¹³⁶ After Chi Cheng made a final plea and decried foul play and favouritism, the Congress approved of the Council resolution, 200 to 153.¹³⁷ Taiwan did not lack sympathisers, but China enjoyed both the favour of the IAAF leadership and broad support among member NFs. This explains why the resolution was adopted even as the tension between the IAAF and the AGF resurged over the exclusion of Israel from the upcoming Bangkok Asian Games.¹³⁸ Predictably, when the RPCAA invited Taiwanese sportspersons to join its delegation at those Games, Chi called Beijing's move “a dirty trick” and claimed that “We w[ould] never accept.”¹³⁹

However, one concern voiced at the 1978 Congress turned into a real problem. The ROCTFA filed and won a lawsuit in the English court against the London-headquartered IAAF in the spring of 1979, and the IAAF's assets could be frozen if it defied the court's injunction that the ROCTFA remain a member.¹⁴⁰ After an intense debate in April, the Council not only decided to “maintain and defend the decision of the Congress” through an appeal (dismissed in 1981), but also actively discussed “taking all convenient measures,” including new rules, to keep Taiwan out¹⁴¹—in Paulen's word, “at all cost [the IAAF] had to maintain [the PRCAA's]

membership.”¹⁴² Fortunately, the IOC EB soon reached an agreement with the PRC that the ROCOC remain in the Olympic Movement and be renamed “Chinese Taipei,” with a non-ROC flag and anthem.¹⁴³ After IOC members ratified this resolution, the ROCOC resisted but capitulated in 1981, and the IAAF, with its appeal dismissed by the court, adopted the IOC’s formula and readmitted the equally reluctant Chinese Taipei Track and Field Association.¹⁴⁴ Both China and Chinese Taipei participated in the inaugural World Athletics Championships in 1983.

With its rising power in world politics, China’s decisive gain in international sport in the 1970s was the writings on the wall—as Paulen stated, sport bodies must face political reality. It is interesting, however, that the IAAF’s tactics shifted around the Tehran Asian Games: before then, the IAAF insisted on seeking an unlikely coexistence of the PRCAA and the ROCTFA; after those Games, the ROCTFA’s membership became increasingly expendable. Burghley might have pledged not to beg for the PRCAA’s application, but his and Paulen’s behind-the-scenes efforts indicated otherwise; for Paulen especially, if that meant modifying rules to push Taiwan out, so be it. The IOC’s role should not be understated, either: Lausanne’s blessing encouraged the IAAF Congress in making the stride to admit the PRCAA at the expense of the ROCTFA, and its resolution of 1979 saved the IAAF from legal jeopardy.

Something’s to Be Gained: Bending Rules for Power Expansion

While they tended to largely follow the IOC’s lead on many issues, IFs must represent and answer to member NFs and navigate unique organisational politics. Through probing the IAAF’s handling of the “China question,” we depict a prominent IF’s power and limitations under the impact of international, domestic, and internal politics. The IAAF, under two pro-PRC presidents and with an increasingly pro-PRC Congress, bent and even specifically changed rules to pursue

the PRCAA's affiliation over three decades and, in doing so, consolidated its unparalleled authority in the global governance of athletics affairs. A self-governing body, the IAAF was certainly within its rights to do so, but certain actions compromised its alleged rule of ideals and principles.

Much of what transpired in the 1950s can be attributed to of an old-school, member-based international club's ill-preparedness for global expansion under a new world order. Rules were incomprehensive and sometimes conveniently circumvented, and the universality of the organisation's ideals was stretched thinner as membership grew. Although he favoured the PRC, Burghley's conviction in institutionalism precluded the exclusion of Taiwan, which, when coupled with Beijing's unnegotiable "one China" policy, decided the PRCAA's short-lived membership. Therefore, the IAAF, despite its proactive efforts in engaging the PRC and taming the ROC, entered the 1960s just like the IOC and most IFs, with a mainland China-shaped void.

In the early 1970s, China stepped out of self-isolation with unprecedented clout in world politics and sought to rejoin international sport governance, rendering the "China question" more critical than ever to sport governing bodies. Faced with China and allies' campaign for Asian Games debut, the IAAF, while continuing to recognise the ROCTFA, effectively suspended Rule 12 to specially concoct the legitimacy for the PRCAA's takeover at the continental level. The more pragmatic Paulen's ascension to presidency in 1976 turned the ROC's expendability from perception into reality. Through requiring an NF's name to reflect its geographical area, the IAAF deemed the ROCTFA's name inappropriate and awarded China's seat to the PRCAA in 1978. This bold move placed the IAAF ahead of the FINA, the FIFA, and the IOC. The PRC's rise in world politics determined the PRCAA's eventual return to world athletics; however, as

shown above, it was Cold War politics, as reflected in the IAAF's internal power struggle, and the leadership's personal belief that shaped the trajectory.

Moreover, the IAAF and its leadership, albeit self-proclaimed faithful subscribers of institutionalism, appeared more comfortable in bending and even changing rules when it facilitated inclusion and expansion. This strategy resembled but exceeded the FIFA's flexible interpretation of its statutes in handling of the "China question" as Homberg observes.¹⁴⁵ That said, between the two IFs, the IAAF maintained a higher level of centrality in the governing its own sport, partially because the leadership steered the membership more effectively and commandingly.¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, the peripheralising and eventual ousting of the ROCTFA after 1974 should not overshadow the fact that the IAAF remained prudent and conservative on the subject of exclusion and opted to modify or clarify rules to justify its action.

The IAAF's unwavering accommodation and eventual affiliation of the PRCAA and the long-lasting reluctance to exclude Taiwan served its purpose of promoting athletics worldwide and consolidated its power in global athletics governance. In particular, the modification of Rule 12 in 1974, a measure that other IFs also adopted over time, constituted a critical technical component in the inclusion of China in international sport and signalled the IAAF's transformation from a physical, membership-based to an ideological, rule-based authority. This move would also prove financially sound as the burgeoning Chinese market demonstrated its value and potential in the IAAF's metamorphosis into a behemoth in the global sport business.

¹ For a few, see Y. Andrew Hao, Thomas M. Hunt, and Matthew T. Bowers, "Institutionalism Prevails: The International Olympic Committee's Management of the 'China Question', 1952–1979," *Journal of Global Sport Management* (2021): 1-18; Dongguang Pei, "'A Question of Names': The Two Chinas Issue and the People's Republic of China in the Modern Olympic Movement" (Master's Thesis, The University of Western Ontario), 1995; Guoqi Xu, *Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 75-196.

² Jörg Krieger, *Power and Politics in World Athletics* (Oxon, U.K.: Routledge, 2021), 88.

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- ³ Dawei Yu, Guangxin Li, Runzhi Liu, and Rufeng Su, "Role Underplayed: Research on the Weakening Function of the All-China Sports Federation from a Historical Perspective," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 32, no. 10 (2015): 1279-1290.
- ⁴ International Olympic Committee (hereafter IOC), Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, Nagoya, October 23-25, 1979, pp. 102-103, IOC Historical Archive (hereafter IOCA).
- ⁵ Hao, Hunt, and Bowers, "Institutionalism Prevails," 1-18.
- ⁶ Jörg Krieger, Lindsay Pieper, and Ian Ritchie, "International Federations and National Governing Bodies: The Historical Development of Institutional Policies in Response to Challenging Issues in Sport," *Sport History Review* 51, no. 1 (2020): 1-6.
- ⁷ Alain Ferrand, Jean-Loup Chappelet, and Benoit Seguin, *Olympic Marketing* (London: Routledge, 2012), 18-23.
- ⁸ IOC, *Olympic Charter*, 67, <https://olympics.com/ioc/olympic-charter>.
- ⁹ Hao, Hunt, and Bowers, "Institutionalism Prevails," 1-18.
- ¹⁰ Thomas Keller, "Report of IFs about China," October 19, 1974, Box D-RM01-CHNRP, Folder 023-SD3, IOCA.
- ¹¹ Since 2019, the IAAF is known under the name World Athletics. However, since this change was long after the investigated time period, we opted to use the acronym IAAF to refer to the organization.
- ¹² For example, IAAF issued a group games-level permit for the Asian Games' track and field competition because the PRC NF did not apply for affiliation. The FINA refused to issue a permit until the PRC NF greatly modified the political rhetoric in its application on the eve of opening ceremony. Also in 1974, the FIFA Congress required a 75%-majority to expel an existing member, effectively precluding a direct replacement of the ROC with the PRC. See Y. Andrew Hao, "The Imperial State of Iran, a Deal-Broker: Enabling the People's Republic of China's Asian Games Debut in the 1974 Tehran Asian Games," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 38, no. 15 (2021): 1612-1626; Heidrun Homburg, "FIFA and the 'Chinese Question', 1954-1980: an Exercise of Statutes," *Historical Social Research* 31, no. 1 (2006): 69-87.
- ¹³ Lijuan Liang, *He Zhenliang and China's Olympic Dream* (Beijing, China: Foreign Language press, 2007), 154.
- ¹⁴ For scholarly works, see note 1. For memoirs, see Liang, *He Zhenliang*, 37-185; Mingxin Tang, *Wo Guo Canjia Ao Yun Cangsang Shi Xia Pian 1949-1996* [The Vicissitudes of the History of Our Country's Participation in the Olympic Games Volume 2, 1949-1996] (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, 1999), 1-520.
- ¹⁵ Homburg, "FIFA," 87.
- ¹⁶ Krieger, *Power and Politics*, 75.
- ¹⁷ Jörg Krieger and Austin Duckworth, "'Vodka and Caviar among Friends' – Lord David Burghley and the Soviet Union's Entry into the International Association of Athletic Federations," *Sport in History* 41, no. 2 (2020): 260-279.
- ¹⁸ IOC, Minutes of the Forty-Seventh Session, Helsinki, July 16-18 & 27, 1952, pp. 7-10, IOCA.
- ¹⁹ Krieger, *Power and Politics*, 89. Interestingly, Burghley likely consulted or referenced the British government's position, as he referenced its recognition of the PRC in his letter to Nikolai Kalinin.
- ²⁰ International Amateur Athletics Federation (hereafter IAAF), Minutes of the Eighteenth Congress, Helsinki, July 18 & 28-29, 1952, p. 5, IAAF Archives (hereafter IAAFA).
- ²¹ *Ibid.*
- ²² Tang, *Wo Guo*, 21-22.
- ²³ Correspondence from Jung Kao-tang to D. T. P. Pain, March 17, 1953, IAAFA.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵ Correspondence from Jung to Pain, October 16, 1954, IAAFA. Pain and Rong had different memories of the details of the meeting. See correspondence from Pain to Jung, November 9, 1954, IAAFA.
- ²⁶ IAAF, Minutes of the Nineteenth Congress, Berne, August 23-24, 1954, pp. 9-10, IAAFA; Correspondence from Pain to Gunsun Hoh, November 9, 1954, IAAFA. The island of Taiwan was named Formosa by Portuguese sailors in the 14th Century and became widely used.
- ²⁷ IAAF, "Handbook 1953," pp. 29-31, IAAFA.
- ²⁸ Correspondence from Pain to Jung, November 9, 1954; Correspondence from Pain to Jung, January 17, 1955.
- ²⁹ Correspondence from Pain to Jung, January 17, 1955.
- ³⁰ Correspondence from Pain to Yu Yuyun, February 15, 1955.

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- ³¹ Correspondence from Ma Yohan and Yu to Pain, May 24, 1955.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ The IOC codified this practice of considering a self-governing geographical area as a country in 1960, but the IAAF never did so officially. However, exceptions existed: the IAAF, after considering West Germany's NF the only German NF and requiring East and West Germany to field a united team at international events for more than a decade, recognised East Germany's NF as a geographic area in 1964. See Krieger, *Power and Politics*, 83-88.
- ³⁴ Correspondence from Pain to Yu, September 8, 1958, IAAFA.
- ³⁵ Athletes from mainland China were unable to participate in world athletes for fifteen years, but at least it resulted from the PRCAA's withdrawal instead of the IAAF's expulsion.
- ³⁶ IAAF, Minutes of the Nineteenth Congress, pp. 8-9, IAAFA..
- ³⁷ IAAF, Minutes of the Twenty-First Congress, Stockholm, August 19 & 25, 1958, pp. 5-6, IAAFA.
- ³⁸ Krieger, *Power and Politics*, 103.
- ³⁹ IAAF, Minutes of the Nineteenth Congress, p. 9, IAAFA.
- ⁴⁰ Correspondence from Yu to Pain, September 13, 1955, IAAFA; Correspondence from ACSF to IOC, NOCs, and IFs, January 18, 1957, IAAFA; Correspondence from PRCAA Secretariat to Pain, February 22, 1957, IAAFA; Correspondence from Yu to Pain, October 16, 1957, IAAFA.
- ⁴¹ Correspondence from Yu to Pain, September 13, 1955, IAAFA.
- ⁴² Correspondence from Pain to Hoh, November 9, 1954, IAAFA; Correspondence from Pain to Hoh, January 17, 1955, IAAFA; Correspondence from Hoh to Pain, November 16, 1955, IAAFA; Correspondence from Pain to Hoh, February 14, 1956, IAAFA; Correspondence from L. K. Kiang to Pain, May 26, 1956, IAAFA.
- ⁴³ IAAF, Minutes of the Twentieth Congress, Melbourne, November 22 & December 3-4, 1956, pp. 3-4, IAAFA.
- ⁴⁴ It is speculated that Dong's resignation, along with his correspondence with Brundage leading up to this point, was not his free choice or doing. See Tang, *Wo Guo*, 148-149.
- ⁴⁵ "Statement of the Athletic Association of the People's Republic of China on Its Withdrawal from the International Amateur Athletic Federation," attached to correspondence from Yu to Pain, August 19, 1958, IAAFA.
- ⁴⁶ Liang, *He Zhenliang*, 154.
- ⁴⁷ Krieger, *Power and Politics*, 59-60.
- ⁴⁸ The Nationalist government in Taiwan still claimed jurisdiction over the whole China, but the CNAAF's focus already transitioned from asserting jurisdiction over mainland China to retaining "China" in its name. This reflected the CNAAF's weakening position in this triangular bargain.
- ⁴⁹ It would be another matter if the CNAAF refused to change its name on behalf of the ROC, but it did start to compete as Taiwan in international athletics events after 1956.
- ⁵⁰ Correspondence from V. Burov to Pain, April 24, 1959, IAAFA.
- ⁵¹ "Statement of the Athletic Association of the People's Republic of China," IAAFA.
- ⁵² Correspondence from Pain to Yu, September 8, 1958, IAAFA.
- ⁵³ David Burghley, "Draft for consideration," February 20, 1959, IAAFA. This is likely a draft memo prepared for Council members.
- ⁵⁴ Dong had resigned from the IOC in 1958.
- ⁵⁵ Correspondence from David Burghley to Dong Shouyi, March 17, 1959, IAAFA.
- ⁵⁶ IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Rome, May 9, 1959, pp. 6-7, IAAFA.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ⁵⁸ Correspondence from Pain to Ma, May 28, 1959, IAAFA.
- ⁵⁹ IAAF, "Official Handbook 1959/60," pp. 39-43, IAAFA.
- ⁶⁰ IAAF, Minutes of the Twenty-Second Congress, Rome, August 30 & September 9, 1960, p. 9, IAAFA.
- ⁶¹ Ibid, p. 10.
- ⁶² Correspondence from Burghley to Dong, September 29, 1960, IAAFA.
- ⁶³ Ibid.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid.
- ⁶⁵ Correspondence from Dong to Burghley, January 3, 1961, IAAFA.

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- ⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ Correspondence from Adriaan Paulen to P. Fox, August 1, 1961, IAAFA.
- ⁶⁸ Correspondence from Pain to Ma, October 12, 1961, IAAFA; Correspondence from Yu to Pain, November 22, 1961, IAAFA.
- ⁶⁹ Correspondence from Burghley to Yu, December 12, 1961, IAAFA.
- ⁷⁰ Correspondence from Burghley to member federations, January 30, 1962, IAAFA.
- ⁷¹ Even though the Sino-Soviet relations had started to sour, cultural exchanges continued until Leonid Brezhnev became USSR President in 1964.
- ⁷² Correspondence from Pain to Leonid Khomenkov, July 3, 1962, IAAFA; Correspondence from Khomenkov to Pain, August 7, 1962, IAAFA.
- ⁷³ For more on the GANEFO, see Rusli Lutan and Hong Fan, "The Politicization of Sport: GANEFO - A Case Study," *Sport in Society* 8, no. 3 (2005): 425-439.
- ⁷⁴ For Chinese elite sport during the Cultural Revolution, see Yuxiang Hao, "A Political History of Chinese Elite Sport during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976" (doctoral dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 2020).
- ⁷⁵ IOC, Minutes of the Sixty-Seventh Session, Mexico City, October 7-11, 1968, p. 21, IOCA.
- ⁷⁶ For more about the ping pong diplomacy between China and the United States, see Nicholas Griffin, *Ping-Pong Diplomacy: The Secret History Behind the Game That Changed the World* (New York, NY: Scribner, 2014).
- ⁷⁷ Yuxiang Hao, "A Political History," 202-203.
- ⁷⁸ UN General Assembly, "Resolution 2758 (XXVI): Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations," October 25, 1971. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054>.
- ⁷⁹ For details regarding the admission of the ACSF to the AGF, see Hao, "The Imperial State of Iran," 1616-1618.
- ⁸⁰ Correspondence from Wang Tih-wu to Burghley, March 30, 1973, IAAFA.
- ⁸¹ The IAAF had not joined GAIF due to a dispute with the other IFs over the IOC-allocation of the television income from the Olympic Games. However, IAAF leadership did attend GAIF meetings at times. See Krieger, *Power and Politics*, 109-120.
- ⁸² Correspondence from Burghley to Wang, May 7, 1974, IAAFA.
- ⁸³ IAAF, Untitled Statement, May 8, 1974, IAAFA.
- ⁸⁴ Correspondence from Wang to Holder, January 23, 1974, IAAFA; Correspondence from Holder to Wang, January 29, 1974, IAAFA.
- ⁸⁵ Correspondence from Wang to Burghley, June 4, 1974, IAAFA; Correspondence from John B. Holt to Wang, June 19, 1974, IAAFA.
- ⁸⁶ Correspondence from Burghley to Lord Killanin, January 23, 1974, IOCA.
- ⁸⁷ IOC, Minutes of Executive Board Meeting, Lausanne, February 9-11, 1974, pp. 23-27, IOCA. Unlike other regional games, which received the IOC's patronage directly, the Asian Games' legitimation was through the patronage the IOC to the AGF.
- ⁸⁸ Correspondence from Burghley to Gholam Reza Pahlavi and all IAAF members, February 12, 1974, Box H-FC02-ASIAN, Folder 014-SD2, IOCA.
- ⁸⁹ IAAF, "China," February 1, 1973, IAAFA; Correspondence from IAAF to Hanji Aoki, February 5, 1973, IAAFA; Correspondence from Burghley and Holder to All Asian Group Members of the IAAF, October 16, 1973, IAAFA; "People's Republic of China, Notes made by the Honorary Secretary of the I.A.A.F. of a Meeting in Peking on 29th November 1973," January 15, 1974, IAAFA; Correspondence from Burghley to Kong Lefei, April 3, 1974, IAAF.
- ⁹⁰ "Leading Member of the Athletic Association of People's Republic of China Issues Statement on Unreasonable I.A.A.F. Action Against Pakistan Athletes," May 28, 1974, IAAFA.
- ⁹¹ Correspondence from Holder to General Secretary of PRCAA, July 5, 1974, IAAFA.
- ⁹² Correspondence from Burghley to President of PRCAA, May 13, 1974, IAAFA.
- ⁹³ "Statement of the Athletics Association of the People's Republic of China," June 24, 1974, IAAFA.
- ⁹⁴ "Notes of a Meeting Between the Honorary Secretary and Mr. Wang of the All-China Sports Federation at the Chinese Embassy London on Saturday July 6th, 1974," IAAFA.

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- ⁹⁵ Correspondence from Holder to all members of the IAAF, July 18, 1974, IAAFA.
- ⁹⁶ For example, in September 1973, the Council decided against sanctioning NFs of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia for Chinese athletes' participation in exhibition events while visiting these countries, for "there was reason to believe a genuine misunderstanding had occurred." See IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Edinburgh, September 7-9, 1973, pp. 3-4, IAAFA. In August 1974, the Council also excused the Mexican NF for an exchange arranged by the Mexican government that it had resisted to no avail. See IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Rome, August 28-29, 1974, p. 6, IAAFA.
- ⁹⁷ IAAF, Minutes of the Twenty-Ninth Congress, Rome, August 29-31, 1974, p. 10, IAAFA.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 11.
- ⁹⁹ IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Edinburgh, September 7-9, 1973, p. 4, IAAFA.
- ¹⁰⁰ Interestingly, while China was the most frequent beneficiary from this rule change, brief discussions took place in 1975 regarding the potential exploitation of this rule by South Africa, which was suspended by the IAAF for the apartheid.
- ¹⁰¹ IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Nairobi, April 18-20, 1975, p. 6, IAAFA.
- ¹⁰² Correspondence from Holt to Song Zhong, March 20, 1975, IAAFA.
- ¹⁰³ Reuters, "International Match for Chinese," *The Times*, November 16, 1974, Box A-P06, Folder 029-SD2, IOCA. The meet took place in Japan instead because of a change in China's domestic political environment. See Xinhua, "Zhongguo Tianjing Daibiaotuan Jieshu dui Riben de Youhao Fangwen [Chinese Tracks and Field Delegation Finishes Friendly Visit to Japan]," *Tiyu Bao*, October 22, 1975, National Library of China.
- ¹⁰⁴ IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Nairobi, August 18-20, 1975, pp. 6-7, IAAFA. The time limit was repeatedly proposed and gained traction in following Council meetings. See IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Grand Quevilly, October 10-12, 1975, pp. 3-4, IAAFA; IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, London, April 23-25, 1976, p. 16, IAAFA.
- ¹⁰⁵ IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Nairobi, August 18-20, 1975, pp. 6-7, IAAFA.
- ¹⁰⁶ IOC, Minutes of the Seventy-Sixth Session, Lausanne, May 21-23, 1975, p. 31, IOCA.
- ¹⁰⁷ IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, London, April 23-25, 1976, p. 16, IAAFA.
- ¹⁰⁸ Correspondence from Holder to Wang, April 29, 1975, IAAFA.
- ¹⁰⁹ Correspondence from Holder to Wang, July 16, 1976, IAAFA.
- ¹¹⁰ Steve Cady, "Taiwan, Nigeria Quit Olympics; More Withdrawals Threatened," *New York Times*, July 17, 1976.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹¹² Correspondence from Paulen to Chi Cheng Reel, November 3, 1976, IAAFA.
- ¹¹³ Correspondence from Paulen to Song Zhong, December 23, 1977, IAAFA.
- ¹¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁵ Correspondence from Song to Paulen, January 13, 1978, IAAFA.
- ¹¹⁶ Correspondence from Chi to Paulen, October 17, 1977, IAAFA.
- ¹¹⁷ Correspondence from Holt to Chi, February 2, 1978, IAAFA; Correspondence from Wang to Paulen, August 14, 1978, IAAFA; Correspondence from Holt to Wang, August 21, 1978, IAAFA.
- ¹¹⁸ "Notes of meeting held at Chateau de Vidy, Lausanne, Saturday 21st January, 1978," Box D-RM01-CHNRP, Folder 028-SD1, IOCA.
- ¹¹⁹ Correspondence from Song to Paulen, January 13, 1978, IAAFA.
- ¹²⁰ "Report to Council on Asian Questions by Adriaan Paulen (I.A.A.F. President)," IAAFA.
- ¹²¹ Ibid.
- ¹²² "Report to Council," IAAFA.
- ¹²³ Ibid.
- ¹²⁴ Ibid.
- ¹²⁵ "China and Taiwan," Ref: C/19B/78, attached to correspondence from Paulen to Council members, September 14, 1978, IAAFA.
- ¹²⁶ Ibid.
- ¹²⁷ Correspondence from Holt to Wang, May 10, 1978, IAAFA.

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- 128 Ibid.
- 129 Correspondence from Wang to Paulen, July 27, 1978, IAAFA.
- 130 Correspondence from Holt to the President of the All-China Sports Federation, May 1, 1978, IAAFA.
- 131 "China and Taiwan," IAAFA.
- 132 Correspondence from Li Menghua to Paulen and Holt, July 22, 1978, IAAFA.
- 133 "Council – P. Rico – October 1978 PR China," IAAFA.
- 134 Ibid.
- 135 IAAF, Minutes of the Thirty-First Congress, San Juan, October 5-6, 1978, p. 28, IAAFA.
- 136 Ibid, p. 29.
- 137 Ibid, pp. 34-36.
- 138 Ibid, pp. 37-38. The Congress in fact voted against granting a permit to the Bangkok Games.
- 139 "Chi Cheng: Offer Is a Dirty Trick," *The Straits Times*, November 22, 1978.
- 140 IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Dakar, April 26-28, 1979, pp. 6-14, IAAFA.
- 141 Ibid, p. 14.
- 142 IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Moscow, June 7-8, 1980, p. 12, IAAFA.
- 143 IAAF, Minutes of Council Meeting, Montreal, August 22-24, 1979, pp. 11-12, IAAFA.
- 144 IAAF, Minutes of the Thirty Congress, Rome, September 1-2, 1981, p. 13, IAAFA.
- 145 Homburg, "FIFA," 69-87.
- 146 Krieger, *Power and Politics*, 143.